Colby College

Digital Commons @ Colby
Honors Theses

Student Research

2019

On Writing and Righting History: The Stakes of Holocaust
Interpretation and Remembrance in Poland and the United States
Noa Gutow-Ellis
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses
Part of the Holocaust and Genocide Studies Commons, and the Jewish Studies Commons

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this
site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial
purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.
Recommended Citation
Gutow-Ellis, Noa, "On Writing and Righting History: The Stakes of Holocaust Interpretation and
Remembrance in Poland and the United States" (2019). Honors Theses. Paper 917.
https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/917
This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital
Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Colby.

ON WRITING AND RIGHTING HISTORY: THE STAKES OF HOLOCAUST
INTERPRETATION AND REMEMBRANCE IN POLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

Noa Gutow-Ellis
History
Colby College
May 2019

Adviser: Dr. Arnout van der Meer
Reader: Dr. Raffael Scheck

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Epigraph ………………………………………………………………………….……………….. 2
Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………………..…...3
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………..….…4
1. Stories of Separate Suffering: Tracing the Historiography of American and Polish
Interpretations of the Holocaust …………………………………………………..………..11
2. “The antonym for Auschwitz is justice”: American Jews Encounter Poland ……………. 29
The Beginnings of American Jewish Holocaust Tourism …………….………….. 32
Entering Mainstream America: Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List ...…..…...…… 38
Selling Schindler’s List to the Public …………………………………………….. 42
The Schindler’s Narrative in Polish Hands ………………………………………. 47
Auschwitz Then, Auschwitz Now …………………………………….………….. 49
3. It Must Be Remembered and It Should Be Stressed: Polish Institutions and the Fight for
Historical Truth ………………………………………………………….………..………. 53
Truth About Camps ……………………………………………………..………... 57
The Polish League Against Defamation & Its Crusade Against Jan Grabowski…. 62
In Their Own Words: IPN’s Accounts of Polish History………………...………. 68
4. Identity, Victimhood, and Gray Zones: The Controversial Publications of Jan Błónski
and Jan Gross …………………………………………………………………….……...…74
Memory vs. Remembering …………………………………………….…………..75
Narrative of Denial: Identity and Victimhood in Poland Pre-2001………….…….78
Narrative of Denial: Identity and Victimhood in Poland, 2001-present ……….… 82
Responding to Neighbors: Identity and Victimhood Outside of Poland …...…….. 88
Neighbors Across Country Lines: Officials Respond …………….………..……...91
5. The Contemporary Fight Over the Not-So-Distant Past …………………………..………94
History as Nationhood ………………………………………………..……………97
History as Enemy …………………………………………………………………. 101
History as Protector …………………………………………………….…………..105
History as Suffering ………………………………………………………………. 109
Epilogue……………………………………………………………………………………….…....111
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………….....116

1

Telling stories makes us human, but not all our stories are humane.
—Alon Confino
A World Without Jews:
the Nazi Imagination from Persecution to Genocide

…Nations don’t suffer – people do.
—Brian Porter-Szûcs
Poland in the Modern World: Beyond Martyrdom
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INTRODUCTION
In his opening remarks at a 2012 ceremony awarding the Presidential Medal of Freedom,
the highest civilian honor in the United States, President Barack Obama joked, “No one ever
picks up a guitar, or fights a disease, or starts a movement, thinking, ‘You know what, if I keep
this up, in 2012, I could get a medal in the White House from a guy named Barack Obama.’”1
Nor did anyone think that what began as a lighthearted set of remarks would turn serious—
“diplomatic gaffe”2 serious—when President Obama awarded the medal posthumously to Polish
resistance fighter Jan Karski. Obama said of Karski, “…Resistance fighters told him that Jews
were being murdered on a massive scale, and smuggled him into the Warsaw Ghetto and a
*Polish death camp* to see for himself.”3 The asterisks are not my own addition. They direct the
reader to an amendment at the top of the archived document reading, “*Note – the language in
asterisks below is historically inaccurate. It should have been: ‘Nazi death camps in German
occupied Poland.’ We regret the error.”4
This amendment came following outrage from Poland. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of
Poland released a statement declaring President Obama guilty of “ignorance, lack of knowledge,
[and] bad intentions.”5 President Obama sent a formal letter of apology to Bronisław
Komorowski, then-President of Poland, two days after his contested remarks in which he
specifically acknowledged the suffering of “the Polish people.”6 Yet the apology did not detract

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Presidential Medal of Freedom Ceremony,” (speech, Washington,
D.C., May 29, 2012), The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/05/29/remarks-president-presidential-medal-freedom-ceremony.
2 “Obama apologises to President Komorowski over ‘Polish death camp’ gaffe,” The News.Pl [English language
extension of Poland’s public radio] June 1, 2012, http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/101343,Obama-apologisesto-President-Komorowski-over-Polish-death-camp-gaffe.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Mark Landler, “Polish Premier Denounces Obama for Referring to a ‘Polish Death Camp’” The New York Times,
May 30, 2012.
6 Letter from President Barack Obama to His Excellency Bronislaw Komorowski, President of the Republic of
Poland. May 31, 2012.
1
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from the uproar in Poland about President Obama’s misuse of words.7 Almost six years later, in
January 2018, news outlets like the Washington Post attributed the occurrence as one of the
inciting factors of the passage of the now-infamous “Holocaust bill” in Poland.8 The bill, an
amendment to the existing Act on the Institute of National Remembrance—the law that
established what is essentially the Polish governmental arm to remember and teach about
national history—promised prison time or a fine for any statement “accusing the Polish state or
people of involvement or responsibility for the Nazi occupation during World War II.”9 This
included banning and punishing individuals for using phrases like “Polish death camps” in
reference to Nazi concentration camps built on occupied Polish soil in wartime. Under such a
law, President Obama would have committed a crime.
In speaking publicly about the law, former United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
said, “[it] adversely affects freedom of speech and academic inquiry,” but maintained that “the
United States reaffirms that terms like ‘Polish death camps’ are painful and misleading.”10 Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued the bill was an “attempt to rewrite history.”11
International outcry existed before the law had even passed, which the Polish government called
inappropriate meddling in their country’s independent legislative affairs. On January 28, just
before news broke that the ‘Holocaust bill’ was signed into law, the Polish Institute of National
Remembrance, a government ministry dedicated to archives, history education, and discussed in
depth in chapter three, issued a press release in response to calls from the Ambassador of Israel

“Obama angers Poles with ‘death camp’ remarks,” The BBC. May 30, 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-18264036
8 Rick Noack, “Obama once referred to a ‘Polish death camp.’ In Poland, that could soon be punishable by 3 years
in prison.” The Washington Post, August 17, 2016. Also: Ruth Eglash and Avi Selk’s “Israel and Poland try to tamp
down tensions after Poland’s ‘death camp’ law sparks Israeli outrage.” The Washington Post, January 28, 2018.
9 Tara John, “Poland Just Passed a Holocaust Bill That Is Causing Outrage. Here’s What You Need To Know.” Time
Magazine, Feb. 1, 2018.
10 James Masters, “Polish President signs controversial Holocaust bill into law,” CNN, Feb. 7, 2018.
11 John, “Poland Just Passed a Holocaust Bill That Is Causing Outrage. Here’s What You Need To Know.”
7
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for Poland to change the bill’s language. The Institute of National Remembrance [in Polish,
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, or IPN] claimed, in part:
For several dozen years, Poland has been repeatedly slandered and portrayed as Hitler’s
accomplice, therefore, defending the good name of our nation against statements that
have nothing to do with historical truth seems to be an obvious and necessary stance.
Earlier, this defense was not effective enough, and the position of the Polish authorities
was not always recognised in the public sphere.12
This press release picked up language Tusk used to accuse Obama of “bad intentions,” namely
that misrepresenting what one claims to be “historical truth” is consequential enough to call for
imprisonment. The legislation and the reasoning behind it were hugely contested, heated, and
watched within the communities who study the events of World War II. The Polish government
has a history of working to silence historians whose findings they do not agree with or do not see
as representing Polish national history in a positive light. This thesis explores the deliberate
attempts by the Polish government to control and shape their historical narrative, the significant
departure that takes place when a politician moves from accusing someone of ignorance or lack
of knowledge to bad intentions. Of great importance is the fact that Tusk accused an American
of bad intentions regarding interpreting and publicly speaking a Polish figure from the Second
World War. It is to the role of the United States—and American Jews in particular—in shaping
narratives about the Holocaust in Poland we now turn.
News of this bill was widely reported in the United States in early 2018, around the same
time I learned I would spend that summer interning at the Galicia Jewish Museum, a Jewish
culture and Holocaust museum in Kraków, Poland. I had friends and family ask me how it was
possible I’d be spending my summer working at a Holocaust museum in Poland if it did not
sound possible to speak freely about it? All I knew was that, well, I had no idea.

“Statement of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in reference to the appeal of the Ambassador to Israel
to change the amendment to the Act on the IPN – 28 January.” Institute of National Remembrance. Jan. 28, 2018.
https://ipn.gov.pl/en/news/1014,Statement-of-the-Institute-of-National-Remembrance-IPN-in-reference-to-theappea.ht
12
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My first day on the job at the museum had not even come to a close before it became
clear to me that the Holocaust bill did not affect the work of the museum or its employees—there
was, as it turned out, a legal stipulation protecting certain institutions, as multiple Poles
explained to me—but even the thought of the law’s existence mattered deeply, though not
exclusively, to one group of tourists in particular who consistently asked about it: American
Jews. Heritage trips through Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular Poland, are popular
within American Jewish communities. Teenagers and young adults often travel through a
program called March of the Living, which brings together thousands of young Jews in Poland
on the Israeli Day of Holocaust Remembrance to march from Auschwitz I to Birkenau, a subcamp typically visited in tandem with Auschwitz I, before all traveling to Israel. Some Jewish
day schools, like the one I attended in Houston, Texas, take students on trips modeled on March
of the Living but go at a different time of year. And many Jewish adults and seniors utilize
certain travel agencies to plan family heritage trips or attend organized trips through local
synagogues or community centers.
The Holocaust occupies a central space in the heart and conscious of American Jews. The
Pew Research Center found in 2013 that 73% of American Jews said “remembering the
Holocaust” was “an essential part of what being Jewish means to them.” This far outnumbered
the 19% of American Jews who said “observing Jewish law” or the 43% who said “caring about
Israel” were essential to their Jewish identity.13 Since the 1970s, scholars have documented the
Americanization of the Holocaust—the process by which the Holocaust moved from the margins
to the center of American life—largely underpinned by cultural works such as the explosive
successes of books or plays like The Diary of Anne Frank, films such as Steven Spielberg’s

Becka A. Alper, “70 years after WWII, the Holocaust is still very important to American Jews,” Pew Research
Center: Fact Tank. August 13, 2015. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/13/70-years-after-wwii-theholocaust-is-still-very-important-to-american-jews/
13
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Schindler’s List, and prominent museums like the United States Holocaust and Memorial
Museum, established in Washington, D.C. in 1993 well before the National Museum of the
American Indian or the National Museum of African American History and Culture. Scholarly
questions surrounding the Americanization of the Holocaust ask why, exactly, a museum
dedicated to the systematic murder of European Jewry would earn the attention of museumgoing Americans before, say, museums dedicated to crimes against humanity on American soil.
And scholars of this process investigate how and why 73% of American Jews would declare that
remembering the Holocaust is an essential part of their Jewish identity, outnumbering any of the
religiously codified aspects of what it typically means to identify as a Jew. Scholarship on the
Americanization of the Holocaust often looks inward at the American Jewish community. This
thesis takes that scholarship and uses it to look outward toward where the histories encapsulated
by the Holocaust and the subsequent stories American Jews encounter took place: Poland.
With this project, I argue that the case of the Polish Holocaust bill and the
Americanization of the Holocaust are closely intertwined. Poland as an independent nation-state
is relatively young. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 that Poland became able
to write its own national history as Americans today interact with and understand it. But by that
time, American cultural markers of the Holocaust had well been established and equated the
horrors of the Holocaust with the geographic space of Poland. Polish national history, sensitive
to the fact that Germany and the Soviet Union occupied their territory for the duration of the
Second World War, rejects the notion that “Poles” or “Poland” as contemporaries see them had
any involvement in the horrific suffering Jews experienced during World War II. 3 million
Polish Jews and 3 million primarily Catholic Poles died in the war. Yet the fact that scholarship
separates these identities, that Polish Jews are always qualified as such and never enlisted simply
as “Poles,” is worth parsing. Polish history does not view World War II through the lens of

8

Jewish suffering; they view it through the lens of Polish Catholic suffering. American Jews,
however, very much view World War II through the lens of Jewish suffering. This places the two
groups at an impasse, the stories they shape their historical narratives around at odds with each
other.
In 2017, Nobel prize-winning writer Kazuo Ishiguro spent part of his Nobel Lecture
explaining a past moment in which he had to reckon with the kinds of stories he had already told
and the kinds of stories he still wanted to tell. “Does a nation remember and forget in much the
same way as an individual does?” he asked. “Or are there important differences? What exactly
are the memories of a nation? Where are they kept? How are they shaped and controlled?” He
continues, asking, “…Can stable, free nations really be built on foundations of willful amnesia
and frustrated justice?”14 These questions are, in a way, similar to the guiding questions of this
project save for one caveat. My work is guided by the principle that historian Brian Porter-Szûcs
has laid out: “nations don’t suffer—people do.”15 The people who make up nations are the ones
deciding what stories are told, and where they are kept, and what has to be cast aside. This is all
to say: the stakes of the differences between Poles and American Jews in interpreting the
Holocaust are high and emotional because, at their core, they are all centered on individual
people and their stories. And not just stories from any time or place: these are stories of deep
suffering. The suffering experienced by Polish Catholics, Polish Jews, and all those in between
during the Second World War is unfathomable to many. As we will later see, some newspapers
found the atrocities so unthinkable that they did not print them. This thesis looks at what groups
of people have done and continue to do with these moments of suffering in their collective
histories. The longstanding separateness between “Poles” and “Jews” within these stories,

Kazuo Ishiguro, “Nobel Lecture” (speech, Oslo, Norway, Dec. 7, 2017), Nobel Prize,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/2017/ishiguro/25124-kazuo-ishiguro-nobel-lecture-2017/.
15 Brian Porter-Szûcs, Poland in the Modern World: Beyond Martyrdom, (Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell,
2014), 4.
14
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something this project explores, has led to fights over perceived differences in experiences of
suffering. Underneath it all—this project, the stories of suffering from World War II, the ways in
which history is remembered or forgotten—is this central question posed by Kazuo Ishiguro
toward the end of his Nobel lecture. “…In the end, stories are about one person saying to
another: This is the way it feels to be me. Can you understand what I’m saying? Does it also feel
this way to you?”16 With that, we begin.

Kazuo Ishiguro, “Nobel Lecture” (speech, Oslo, Norway, Dec. 7, 2017), Nobel Prize,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/2017/ishiguro/25124-kazuo-ishiguro-nobel-lecture-2017/.
16
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CHAPTER ONE
Stories of Separate Suffering:
Tracing the Historiography of American and Polish Interpretations of the Holocaust
Sitting behind the front desk at the Galicia Jewish Museum this summer, a museum
located in the heart of Kazimierz—Kraków’s Jewish quarter, home to famous synagogues and
cemeteries, kitschy restaurants, Jewish bookstores and Schindler’s List tour stops—I sold
entrance tickets to many American Jews visiting Poland to retrace their family history. Most
striking to me was how the families knew about the past in terms of death. “This is the name of
the village where my grandfather was killed,” they could say. Yet the families often knew
nothing about the past in terms of life. “What kind of life did my grandfather lead in the
village?” was their often-unanswerable question. The American Jews tracing their roots had
virtually no answers, and no way to answer, these questions. Anthropologist Erica Lehrer writes
of a similar reckoning during her fieldwork in Kazimierz spent researching her 2013 book Jewish
Poland Revisited: Heritage Tourism in Unquiet Places. She says of seeing an American Jewish
performer at a Polish synagogue, “I was perplexed by his presence…He was the Jewish present;
what was he doing here in the Jewish past?”17 There is a tension that exists today between
difficult historical accounts and filtered contemporary representations of Poland. It is precisely a
desire to visit the sites of a Jewish past decimated in wartime as the draw of Poland for American
Jewish tourists on heritage or mission trips. These make up some of the more than one million
tourists who visit Auschwitz each year, as well as the writers, artists, and filmmakers using
Poland to tell stories like Steven Spielberg and his Academy Award winning film, Schindler’s
List.18 Visiting Poland to seek stories of Jewish suffering causes strife among Poles who interpret

Erica Lehrer. Jewish Poland Revisited: Heritage Tourism in Unquiet Places (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2013) 25.
18 “Visitors to the Auschwitz Site,” State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau,
http://70.auschwitz.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=173&lang=en.
17

11

history, particularly the outcome of World War II, as part of a forward looking, Catholic-Polespecific, nationalist narrative.
Historical spots of mass atrocity in Poland in particular are today often spots for major
tourist traffic. This is a source of anxiety for many Poles, especially Polish leaders trying to
establish their nation on the world stage in a light beyond what happened to Polish Jews in
World War II. An example of an institution encouraging Americans to visit Poland specifically
through the lens of touring Holocaust sites comes from a Global Volunteers: Poland brochure
published in 1994, the same year Steven Spielberg released Schindler’s List. Erica Lehrer writes
of the brochure, noting the complexities of developing an understanding of a nation through the
lens of its darkest histories:
Of course, such attractions may well generate interest in history as much as obscuring or
distorting it, but it was still a discomfiting suggestion about the relative value of historical
traces and their re-presentation as entertainment to receive a brochure from a U.S.
volunteer organization describing the area around Krakow “as a beautifully quaint region
which is only a half-hour drive from Auschwitz, the site of the Academy Award winning
movie Shindler’s List [sic].19
Lehrer is writing of the tension between American and Polish interpretations of the Holocaust.
Both groups use the Holocaust to make entirely different associations about the geographic space
of Poland: Americans see it as a site of atrocities whereas Poland sees it as a land where their
nation overcame the yoke of wartime occupation. We arrive here because Americans understand
the Holocaust by way of cultural markers such as Schindler’s List which places Poland at the
center of narratives of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust. It is important to note that this brochure
invokes both the suffering associated with Schindler’s List and touring Auschwitz as a draw
enticing enough to encourage someone to travel to Poland in the first place. Notably, the
Academy Award winning film is not a documentary, as criticism discussed later in this chapter

19

Lehrer. Jewish Poland Revisited, 33. [Reference to 1994 brochure from Global Volunteers Poland]
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argues, yet Steven Spielberg made clear that his goal in creating the film was “to educate high
school students about the Holocaust, which ‘had been treated as just a footnote in so many
textbooks or not mentioned at all.’”20 It is in large part through Schindler’s List that American
Jews (and Americans in general) come to associate the Holocaust with Poland—the entire movie
was deliberately filmed on location in Poland and children of survivors stood as background
actors—and view the Holocaust through a narrative of Jewish suffering. And, as I will later
argue, this notion of American Jewish tourism to Poland did not begin in the 1990s upon the
movie’s release. In 1969, the American Jewish Congress—an organization formed to represent
American Jewish interests at the 1918 Peace Conference and established permanently as “one of
the most influential agencies in defending the interests of the American Jewish community”21 —
published a guidebook and accompanying advertisement to encourage American Jews to visit
places such as Poland. The book asked travelers to pay respect to the dead and to reflect, through
good-willed actions while abroad and at home, on their experiences when they returned home
because “the antonym for Auschwitz is justice—justice here, freedom now—not for ourselves
alone but for every man who is our brother.”22 While the guidebook had tips and reasoning for
visiting countries all across Europe, the American Jewish Congress placed special focus on
Poland, writing, "All of Poland is a Jewish memorial.”23 This key archival find shows that as
early as the 1960s, American Jewish institutions engaged the broader community in asking
questions such as, “Why should the vacationer go out of his way to visit the places where

Gary Weissman, Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts to Experience the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004), 163.
21 Adina Anflick, Marvin Rusinek, Vital Zajka, and Eric Fritzler. “Historical Note” in “Guide to the Records of the
American Jewish Congress, undated, 1916-2006,” American Jewish Historical Society.
22 In Everlasting Remembrance advertisement, 1993-4; American Jewish Congress, records; I-77; box 646; folder
18; American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.
23 In Everlasting Remembrance: A Guide to Memorials and Monuments Honoring the Six Million, American Jewish
Congress Public Relations Department, 1969, 7.
20
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European Jewry suffered its catastrophe?”24 The connotation of the question in context was that
such an action should not be much of a question at all but rather an accepted, newfound
pilgrimage instead.
Tension arises because the Holocaust and the Second World War more broadly, to Poles,
are narratives of Polish suffering that took place in the geographic space of Nazi occupied
Poland and Soviet-occupied Poland in 1939-41 and after 1944 when Poles did not have
independence under outside regimes. To have bus after bus of American Jews searching for, as
the American Jewish Congress asked, “mass graves [of Jews] covered by a single stone,” takes
away from the distinctly Polish stories of suffering that the nation wants acknowledged.25 One
way to understand the different interpretations of the past is to understand the different ways in
which contemporaries experienced the war. Historian Tony Judt argues that there has to be a
balance between noting that “In retrospect, ‘Auschwitz’ is the most important thing to know
about World War Two,” and noting that is not how Europeans understood the situation at the
time. In other words, it is not how contemporaries experienced the war. The French, Judt argues,
accepted Vichy not because “it pleased them to live under a regime that persecuted Jews, but
because Pétainist rule allowed the French to continue leading their lives in an illusion of security
and normality and with minimum disruption.”26 This is significant because Judt acknowledges
the role of the Holocaust and narratives of Jewish suffering in contemporary interpretations of
World War II, but places it as one of many distressing aspects of the war to Europeans living in
wartime. Tension exists because some nations, like Germany, have responded to contemporary
interpretations of the genocide of Jews as central to World War II with memorials, laws banning

In Everlasting Remembrance advertisement, 1993-4; American Jewish Congress, records; I-77; box 646; folder
18; American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.
25 In Everlasting Remembrance: A Guide to Memorials and Monuments Honoring the Six Million, American Jewish
Congress Public Relations Department, 1969, 2.
26 Ibid.
24
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Holocaust denial, museums, and education efforts. In nations such as Poland, the immense
atrocities of World War II indeed take center stage in national memory, but, “It is just that Jews
were not part of the story.”27
It is vital to note that “Pole” and “Jew” are considered two separate groups of people.
When the word “Pole” is used in this chapter, it denotes a non-Jewish (likely Catholic) Pole.
Jewish Poles will always be classified as such. By the time of the Second World War, Jews had
lived in Poland for centuries but were classified as Other as they still are today. In his book The
Jews in Polish Culture, originally published in Polish in 1961, Aleksander Hertz—an eminent
Polish social scientist who researched and published heavily in the 1930s—writes, “The facts of
‘separateness,’ ‘alienness,’ total ‘isolation,’ and social, political, and cultural ‘autonomy’ were
always accepted as self-evident by both Jews and Poles.”28 This started as religious divides
between Judaism and Catholicism, the longstanding predominant religion in Poland. It was not
until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s that Catholic doctrine explicitly stated that all
Jews were not to blame for the killing of Jesus Christ—“…what happened in His passion cannot
be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today”—a
longstanding point of anti-Judaic sentiment and tension within the Catholic community.29 In the
twentieth century, Hertz argues, “Generally speaking, [it] could be reduced to a shared belief in
the constitutional separateness of Jews, their basic alienness in any human milieu and under all
conditions. Racism became the most extreme form those rationalizations took.”30 Such
separateness continued well into the twentieth century and remains today in the twenty-first
century. Through the war and into the present day, scholarship on the Second World War

Judt, Postwar, 822.
Aleksander Hertz, The Jews in Polish Culture (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988): 13. [Translated
by Czesław Miłosz. Originally published as Żydzi w kulturze polskiej by Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1961.]
29 Vatican Council II, Nostra Aetate accessed November 18, 2018, Vatican.va, 4.
30 Hertz, The Jews in Polish Culture, 15.
27
28
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(especially, though not exclusively, coming out of Poland) differentiates between the three
million Polish Jews and three million Catholic Poles killed in wartime.
Later scholarship from Joanna Beata Michlic, published decades after the fall of Soviet
rule in Poland in 1989, examines the continuation of the separateness of Jews and Poles. In her
book Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present, she writes,
The presence of anti-Jewish idioms in Polish cultural and political life [can] be seen as
one of the chief markers of the modern Polish ethno-nationalism that began in the late
nineteenth century as a manifestation of the wider European phenomenon of exclusivist
ethno-linguistic or integral nationalism.31
Polish nationalism is specific to the suffering of non-Jewish Poles—a phenomenon historian
Tony Judt drew attention to—under occupation, and has been that way throughout Polish
histories of occupation going back centuries.
The literature discussed in this chapter provides a look into the histories told over time of
the tension and competing narratives between the suffering of Poles and Jews. This accounts for
the ways the Holocaust defines Polish national identity to outsiders, and the implications of
Americans entering a historical understanding of Poland through works of popular culture that
have been largely Americanized—which is to say sometimes simplified and often (mis)directing
all blame on Poles and the Polish nation. The direct results are the work on behalf of Poles to
revise, rewrite, and ultimately right history.
The Holocaust is a historical event that has understandably captured the attention of the
world and the United States in particular. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, an
institution opened in 1993 and dedicated to the murder of European Jewry, came about 11 years
before the opening of the National Museum of the American Indian and 23 years prior to the
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opening of the National Museum of African American History and Culture.32 The Holocaust is
not an American historical event in that Americans were not the direct victims or perpetrators,
nor did the events take place on American soil. Even so, the Holocaust has been and remains at
the center of American cultural life. The Holocaust achieved this spot largely in part through its
rise in popular culture which is significant because it results in depictions of the Holocaust that
may not be historically accurate but are instead adapted for a particular audience.
Consider Steven Spielberg’s 1993 Academy Award winning film Schindler’s List, a work
of popular culture which profoundly shaped the Holocaust in American minds. Spielberg’s
choice to film as much as he could in Poland, an aspect heavily publicized leading up to the
movie’s release, and the casting of many children of Holocaust survivors or Polish witnesses as
actors, created a “deliberate blurring of the borders between cinema and history.”33 Schindler’s
List left such a mark that Michael André Bernstein, a scholar of English, defines the influence of
popular culture on the American perception of the Holocaust as “The Schindler’s List Effect”—a
phenomenon on full display in the travel brochure which Erica Lehrer pointed to earlier in this
chapter. The Schindler’s List Effect underlies the tension between American and Polish
interpretations of the Holocaust and the Polish past. Gary Weissman, scholar of English, argued
that through Schindler’s List, Spielberg turned Poland into a country, a people, and a story
entirely composed of suffering. Notably, the suffering is associated with Jews at the hands of
Poles—not, as is important to Poles, the suffering of Poles at the hands of Germany, the Soviet
Union, and the rest of the world that “betrayed them” and left them behind the Iron Curtain
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following the war.34 This is the argument of Polish historian Halik Kochanski in her 2012 book,
The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War.
Borrowing from a movie review that said, “Poland is a special effect which gives the
movie a distinct chill,” Gary Weismann shows that Schindler’s List irrevocably altered Poland’s
reputation among the 25 million Americans who saw the film in theaters, and the 65 million
Americans who saw the film on network television.35 In other words, the ways in which the
Holocaust is presented to Americans and placed within the nation’s consciousness puts a story of
Jewish suffering and redemption by a German man in a Polish context. This is not how Poland
remembers or teaches about the Second World War. The Polish narrative is not about Jewish
suffering—it is about Polish suffering at the hands of occupiers as a repeated occurrence in
Polish history. Poland contends with outsiders coming into contact with their nation through the
lens of the Holocaust and a history of occupation dating back to the eighteenth century meaning
the nation only became able to write its own history as of 1989. While Poland saw independence
between 1918-1939, and though a country does not require independence to write national
histories, post-1989 is when Polish history confronted the Second World War years—the time in
which revisionist history came to the forefront of the Polish nationalist project.
Historians trace Polish history back to the founding of the Kingdom of Poland in 1025
which later transformed into the larger Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. Starting in the
1770s, neighbors Prussia, Russia, and Austria partitioned the Commonwealth three separate
times. It was only in 1918 that Poland saw restoration as an independent country, but soon after,
in 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union split Poland between them (as well as a small bit to
Slovakia). Poland remained part of the Soviet Bloc until 1989 when it held free elections, and in
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1998 initiated talks to join the European Union. Poland’s long history of foreign occupation and
rule informs contemporary sensitivities on the part of Poles and the government. Citizens and
government officials alike reject blame for the actions of their occupiers, and this is particularly
acute in relation to Holocaust memory.
In his book Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust, historian
Michael C. Steinlauf argues that Poles were witnesses to the Holocaust unlike any other group
for three reasons: their closeness to the killing meant that they witnessed but did not necessarily
comprehend the widespread, systemized nature of the killing36; in addition to their role as
witnesses, non-Jewish Poles were victims, “the most relentlessly tormented national group in
Hitler’s Europe”37; and witnessing ranged from benefiting economically, to actively resisting, to
risking one’s life to hide or save Jews, to simply trying to stay alive in wartime.38 Steinlauf takes
these factors and analyzes how, combined with the Polish historical context of particular postwar moments, each component of Polish witnessing of the Holocaust demonstrates that nonJewish Poles as a people and Poland as a nation have never quite found the response or the way
to remember the horrors they saw; it is still a work in progress. This is particularly apparent in
(and later because of) the post-war years from 1945 until 1989 when Poland was part of the
Eastern Bloc and Joseph Stalin deemed their “prehistory” irrelevant. Steinlauf provides the
understanding that for Poles, grappling with memories and interpretations of what it meant to be
a key witness to the Holocaust was, as of his book’s publication in 1997, an entirely recent
undertaking. It is no coincidence this is around the same time that Spielberg’s Schindler’s List
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was released in theaters and later on primetime network television in the United States, as it was
in the 1990s that films, books, and exhibits such as the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum all began to make space for themselves within American culture. As a result, it is in this
time period, the 1990s, that just as Poles began to confront their own history, they were also
confronted with loaded interpretations of their history by Americans.
Polish sociologist Sławomir Kapralski, in his contribution to The Twentieth Century in
European Memory, agrees with and builds on Steinlauf’s argument. Kapralski uses the
periodization that Steinlauf created to mark when and how Jews and the Holocaust were
differently remembered or forgotten in Poland.39 Kapralski, writing in 2017, contends that it was
in part through popular culture—for example, Claude Lanzmann’s 1985 award-winning, widely
translated film, Shoah—that Poles began to be inundated with interpretations of Holocaust
memory that contributed to a “progressing threshold of shame.”40 Poles learned that the
interpretations of the Holocaust coming out of America—or, in the case of Shoah, were highly
lauded and popular in America—and spreading around the world saw Poles as “passive
witnesses of the Holocaust who did not express compassion and often seemed to be pleased with
Nazi persecutions of the Jews.”41 Similarly, Kapralski argues that texts such as Jan T. Gross’s
widely read Neighbors (2001), about an incident in the Polish town of Jedwabne in which Poles
committed a massacre against their Jewish neighbors, led the world to see Poles not merely as
witnesses but also as perpetrators which directly contradicted how Poles themselves remembered
the war years.42 It is worth noting—and this thesis later explores this in-depth—that Poles had
been engaged in confronting questions about their roles in World War II since the late 1980s
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with Jan Błónski’s controversial article for a popular Polish weekly, “The Poor Pole Looks at the
Ghetto.” The intensity of such national conversations picked up after the fall of the Iron Curtain
in 1989 when Poland had a newfound place on the international stage. It is after this time period
that we began to see quantitative research on Polish attitudes toward such issues.
In “Polish Remembrance of World War II,” Barbara Szacka presents her research project
in which she took studies conducted by the University of Warsaw and the Institute of Political
Studies to assess the Polish population’s contemporary interpretations of the past at three time
points: 1965, 1988, and 2003. These years are significant because 1965 was in the midst of
Soviet control over Poland; 1988 saw widespread workers strikes that forced the Polish
government to negotiate with the Polish Solidarity (anti-communism) movement a year later;43
and in 2003 Poland signed a treaty to join the European Union the following year.44 Szacka
argues that the data throughout these years shows “a widespread belief among Poles that World
War II events constituted sources of pride.”45 Szacka shows that feelings of shame were rare
until 2003 when an increased number of respondents frequently mentioned that “behavior
towards Jews (failure to help, indifference, participation in action against Jews)” produced
feelings of shame. Her argument is significant because it poses the question of what changed?
She speculates on outside influences that might have caused a general shift from feelings of pride
to shame, including newfound widespread knowledge of accounts such as Jan Gross’s book on
the Jedwabne massacre.46 I believe Jan Gross’s work is indeed a part of the cause of this shift, as
his controversial work on Jewish suffering at the hands of anti-Semitic Poles during and after
World War II reverberated throughout Poland and resulted in serious legal confrontations for
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him by the Polish government when he was investigated for possibly breaking laws against
defaming Poland.47 So too did the success of Schindler’s List, the immense popularity of books
such as Primo Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz or Elie Wiesel’s Night, and attention to the Holocaust
reverberate throughout in Poland—in particular for the fact that these cultural works all reckon in
some way with the events that transpired in the concentration camps on occupied Polish soil.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that parts of American popular culture—be it Jan Gross’s book
Neighbors (published in both American academic and popular presses), Steven Spielberg’s
Schindler’s List, bestselling books and plays such as The Diary of Anne Frank—spread around
the world and could have influenced Poles. But why was American popular culture concerned
with the Holocaust?
Historian Peter Novick’s The Holocaust in American Life provides the historical
framework necessary for understanding the uptick in American culture’s attention to the
Holocaust in the years following World War II. Novick argues that “America’s wartime response
to the Holocaust is what a great deal of later Holocaust discourse in the United States has been
about,” most notably the “…obliviousness of American gentiles,” the “indifference…by a timid
and self-absorbed American Jewry,” and “the abandonment of the Jews by the Roosevelt
administration,”48 all of which “…made the United States a passive accomplice in the crime.”49
Novick also reasons in a way similar to Tony Judt’s argument on behalf of Polish witnesses,
writing that Americans learned about the Holocaust “in the midst of a global war that eventually
killed between fifty and sixty million people,” meaning it was “the overall course of the war that
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dominated the minds of Americans in the early forties.”50 Novick’s argument reaches into the
realm of American (and particularly American Jewish) guilt, processing, and the widespread
efforts to remember, largely through the lens of popular culture. Guilt in particular is a
phenomenon that I hypothesize rose out of scholarship such as the work of Deborah Lipstadt in
her 1986 book, Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1939-1945
which was the first comprehensive study of what the American press—and indirectly the
American population—knew, reported on, and left out of their newspapers during the Second
World War. A review in the New York Times, the same newspaper Lipstadt had heavily criticized
for its wartime reporting, sums it up best with their headline: “The Unthinkable Was
Unprintable.”51 Historical perspective provides, of course, the knowledge that the unthinkable
was indeed taking place.
But the Holocaust did not become a mainstay of American Jewish life and identity—the
73% of American Jews who say remembering the Holocaust in an essential part of being
Jewish—through guilt alone. Novick reasons that the organized American Jewish community
had reason to be concerned by the 1960s that the continuity of American Jewish life was in
trouble. He draws from a 1964 cover story in Look magazine titled “The Vanishing American
Jew” and the finding that “by the late sixties more than 40 percent of young Jewish men…were
marrying gentiles.”52 Novick argues the response to these communal worries could be summed
up by an address Rabbi Joachim Prinz delivered to the American Jewish Congress in which he
said “that young Jews’ unwillingness to consider ‘Jewish identification and solidarity,’ their
‘indifference in matters Jewish,’ was largely attributed to their ignorance of the European
catastrophe.’”53 Encountering narratives from the Holocaust was then pushed into the
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mainstream American Jewish community, and later, as we will see, into mainstream American
culture as well.
Hilene Flanzbaum extends Peter Novick’s argument regarding the presence of the
Holocaust in American life in her article, “The Americanization of the Holocaust.” The
Americanization of the Holocaust is a process by which the Holocaust moved from the margins
to the center of American life, which Flanzbaum reasons is a direct, simultaneous response to
and shaping factor of the American approach to Holocaust memory. “…The American
responsibility to remember bears a distinctive national character,” she writes, “Not only did the
American Jewish community—the largest and wealthiest in the world —feel a moral imperative
to remember and educate, it did so in the face of special challenges,” which she defines to
include popular taste, media hype, and democratic optimism.54 The Americanization of the
Holocaust increased over time, be it through the radio broadcast of the Adolf Eichmann trial in
1961, the NBC “Holocaust” mini-series in 1978, the release of Schindler’s List in 1993, or the
opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum on the National Mall in the same
year.55
What Novick’s work gets at and Flanzbaum’s builds on is this notion of the Holocaust as
doing something to bind American Jewry together, whether through guilt or building an identity
around a concept of ensuring together that an event of great importance and sorrow was never
forgotten. Yet not all scholars agree with Novick or Flanzbaum. Most notably, historian Hasia
Diner argued in her 2009 book We Remember With Reverence and Love that Novick’s historical
study passes over the immediate post-war years in favor of the post-1960s explosion of the
Holocaust in Jewish life and popular culture. Diner argues that the years 1945 through 1962 were
indeed among the most formative in understanding “the ways in which a group of women and
54
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men, the Jews of the United States, went about the process of shaping, from the ground up, a
memorial culture.”56 While Diner makes a compelling case throughout her book, Novick’s focus
on the rise and expansion of the Holocaust in popular culture (both in and beyond America) is
interconnected with Polish understanding and memory in a way that Diner’s argument is not, as
her interpretations are specific to American Jews within the United States. Novick’s interest is in
what the Holocaust did for American Jews while Diner’s interest is in what American Jews did
for the Holocaust. My project is more interested in what the Holocaust—a specific portrayal of
the Holocaust, we will soon see—did for American Jews and what they then did for and to Polish
consciousness with these encounters.
For an understanding of the implications of American historical interpretations of Poland
through the lens of the Holocaust in popular culture, we must look to Polish scholarship. Robert
Cherry, an economist at Brooklyn College who writes also on anti-Polish biases in the United
States, and Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, a Polish anthropologist based at Jagiellonian University
in Kraków, edited a collection of scholarship called Rethinking Poles and Jews: Troubled Past,
Brighter Future. A primary chapter in this book, written by Polish historian Mieczysław B.
Biskupski, argues that, in particular, “the genre of Holocaust cinema has become noteworthy for
its neglect of the Polish context of the issue and its aggressive hostility toward Poland and the
Poles.”57 We must pause to ask: to whom is this neglect noteworthy? Biskupski continues,
writing, “Despite the dramatic circumstances of Poland’s involvement in the war, Hollywood
chose to ignore Poland, dedicating a mere three films substantially to that country’s plight, far
fewer than to quiescent Czechoslovakia, collaborationist France, or insignificant Norway.”58 As
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demonstrated by the pointed adjectives, Biskupski’s argument and writing is emotional and
impassioned, and must be interpreted accordingly. He demonstrates that Poles feel the narratives
of their suffering are left out of the international conversation in favor of Jewish suffering in
films such as Schindler’s List or Sophie’s Choice, which Biskupski provides as examples.
Historian Tony Judt’s argument bears repeating here: It is not that Poles are not thinking or
remembering World War II—they are—“It’s just that Jews are not part of the story.”59
Americans understand the Holocaust in Poland through a lens of Jewish suffering, while Poles
see it only through their own suffering.
In Poland, to be Jewish and to be Polish are two separate identities. We know this from
scholarship dating from the 1960s and on, and we know it from primary sources. Yekhiel
Kirshnbaum, a Polish Jew who lived near Warsaw from the early 20th century until he moved to
Israel in 1968, contributed a piece called “The City Without Jews” to a memorial book of Polish
Jewish experiences in wartime. During the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, he recounts, he learned
that the city council of his town had accumulated clothes, bedding, and other necessities that
Germans left upon fleeing—much of those items, of course, originally belonging to the town’s
Jews. The mayor refused to give the Jews their belonging back, saying it would have to be
proven that the items indeed belonged to the Jewish individuals, and Kirshnbaum writes, “This
made me terribly angry. I understood that no one would help us, that even in the new Poland, a
wall of alienation stood between us and our neighbors.”60 To identify as Polish versus Jewish as
completely separate is why, for example, Cherry and Orla-Bukowska’s book is titled Poles and
Jews. Polish Jews do not receive mention, and although Jews were citizens of Poland, Polish
scholarship consistently differentiates between the deaths of 3 million Poles in World War II and
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the deaths of 3 million (Polish) Jews. The problematic implications arise in what Polish
scholarship and national historical narratives deliberately leave out: suffering of Jews at the
hands of Poles.
As a result, it is essential to know that the following historiographies are highly
controversial, provocative, and contested by the current Polish government. The work of Jan T.
Gross in Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland as well as
Jan Grabowski’s book, Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland led
to the historians being threatened with prosecution,61 stripping of their national honors,62 and
national Polish publicity campaigns to delegitimize the scholars and their work.63 All of this is
explored in depth in later chapters. In Neighbors, Jan Gross presents for the first time the
unpopular work of combining the histories of Poles and Jews in wartime to show that Poles
inflicted suffering upon Jews without being made to do so by the Nazis. He uses primary source
testimony to paint a picture of the massacre against Jews in the village of Jedwabne in 1941, and
writes to overturn the “standard historiography” which he argues “posits that there are two
separate wartime histories” pertaining separately to the Jews and all other citizens living in a
country under Nazi occupation.64 Gross’s ultimate question, and the most unpopular, is: “How
can the wiping out of one-third of its urban population [Jews] be anything other than a central
issue of Poland’s modern history?”65 This question unseats the traditional Polish narratives that
Polish suffering is completely separate from Jewish suffering and that Jewish suffering is
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separate from Polish history, and it falls more in line with the narratives presented by American
popular culture—namely cinematic presentations of the Holocaust.
Jan Grabowski’s book focuses exclusively on Judenjagden—Jew hunts—which took
place “at the margins of the Holocaust,” as he describes it, in places far from killing centers like
Auschwitz or urban centers like Warsaw.66 These Jew hunts, whose victims numbered in the
200,000s, were typically undertaken by German officers67. The questions that Grabowski
answers involve “how exactly the Germans knew where to look for the Jews, and [uncovering]
the circumstances surrounding the detection and death of unfortunate refugees hidden in the
villages and forests of the Polish countryside.”68 Grabowski’s evidence and conclusions put
Poles at the center of actions involving betrayal and murder of Jews, and like the findings of Jan
Gross, implicate Poles in contributing to the suffering of Polish Jews. This historiography does
not fit in with the narratives of Poland—and the work of scholars such as Mieczysław B.
Biskupski arguing the prevalence of anti-Polish biases in representations of the Holocaust—in
their postwar remembrance.
As the remainder of this thesis will argue and demonstrate, the issue arises when Poland
actively works to discount and delegitimize scholarship critical of wartime actions of Poles in
relation to the Holocaust. While Poland writes and engages in a revisionist history of its past, it is
pushing stories of Jewish suffering out of the picture while American narratives furiously work
to make Jewish suffering the whole picture. We can see a push and pull between narratives, and
ultimately understand that there is no easy dichotomy in Poland or the United States—then or
today—between the Jewish past and present, as Erica Lehrer’s account of the Jewish performer
in Kraków recounted.
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CHAPTER TWO
“The antonym for Auschwitz is justice”69: American Jews Encounter Poland
I was a high school senior a month away from graduation when I first visited Poland. I
attended a Jewish day school with the capstone student experience of a month-long trip abroad: a
week in Poland followed by three weeks in Israel. It was modeled after March of the Living, a
trip for Jewish teenagers around the world (though Americans and Canadians make up most of
the numbers) to visit Poland and Israel over Holocaust Remembrance Day and subsequently
Israeli Independence Day. The trip brings along Holocaust survivors, too, and everyone marches
together from Auschwitz I to Birkenau, the famed concentration camp complex, in an emotional
event, a cry signaling we’re still here. In embarking on my school trip, I knew almost nothing
about Poland except for thinking about it in terms of where the Holocaust happened. I was more
excited at the prospect of my first time traveling overseas than for anything I might encounter on
the trip. I knew about the Holocaust because I had visited Holocaust museums across the
country—from D.C. to L.A.—and taken a class on it in my senior year. I knew to distinguish
between the Gestapo and the Einsatzgruppen; I had heard multiple survivors speak; and when I
was thirteen and had a bat mitzvah, a Jewish coming of age ceremony, my synagogue gave me
the name of Fani Volf, a young girl who died in Auschwitz before she reached age 13, to read
aloud at my ceremony. My experience brought to life the origins of what Peter Novick
illuminated in remembering and teaching about the Holocaust as a tool for Jewish continuity in
the United States. But I hadn’t encountered Poland, not really, not beyond knowing it was where
the most well-known camps existed.
I do not remember a lot about that month-long trip but I do distinctly recall being so
disturbed during my time in Poland by the “facts” our (American-Israeli) guide gave us. We
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visited Majdanek, for example, a concentration camp near Lublin, and he insisted that it “could
be up and running in 24 to 48 hours.” Notice the apartment complexes surrounding the camp, he
told us, and take this image with you. He wanted us to come away with a mental picture of Poles
sitting in their apartments during wartime, ambivalent to the mass murder of Jews taking place
just outside their windows. His statement implied Polish complicity, awareness, and complete
disregard for Jews during World War II. I was skeptical of this—the apartments did not look to
me like they had been standing in the 1940s—and felt there was simply no way that could be the
full story. I took the image he instilled of the still-standing concentration camp surrounded by
apartments with me for sure, though perhaps not in the way he intended.
This information delivered by the guide was deeply problematic, emotionally
manipulative, and just plain false. Over coffee this past January with a friend writing a master’s
thesis on March of the Living’s approach to Poland, he recounted trying to suppress laughter
when multiple trip leaders told him in interviews that same fact, the 24-48 hours quip, which
they always drive home to their groups. “They seem to be implying that the Poles would do
that,” he exclaimed. Anthropologist Erica Lehrer, who led a March of the Living delegation as
part of her fieldwork in the early 2000s and is an authoritative scholar on Jewish mission trips to
Poland, described touring Majdanek and hearing the same sentiment from her guide. This is of
particular significance, she argues. “Since Germany is rarely mentioned in the context of these
trips, presumably it is the local Poles who are envisioned as the camp’s potential new
operators.”70 These anecdotes demonstrate the extent to which Jewish visitors, youth in
particular, have been conditioned to think about Poland as land of death, a place filled with
decidedly unfriendly and untrustworthy citizens and a population who sat in their apartments
literally watching Jews go up in flames. What is not mentioned? The housing surrounding
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Majdanek is Soviet-era block housing that did not exist in the 1940s. Poles never operated the
camps—they were often also imprisoned there—while Germans did. Yet there are no Jewish
mission trips to Germany; American Jewish teenagers are sent to visit Auschwitz, not Dachau.
Israel, in fact, has sent all eleventh-grade students on a week-long history trip to Poland since
1988.71
This chapter explores the historical moments that have shaped the ways American Jews
encounter Poland. Doing so allows us to explore what Polish authorities have to respond to in
writing—and why they place such emphasis on righting international understandings of—their
national history especially since they came out from behind the Iron Curtain in 1989. This
chapter first looks at tourism to and encounters with Poland through an American Jewish lens.
Starting in 1969 when the American Jewish Congress published a guidebook to visiting Jewish
memorials across Europe with particular attention to Poland, American Jews learned to see
Poland through a lens of Jewish destruction. In 1993, when Steven Spielberg released his
Academy Award winning film Schindler’s List to much success and fanfare, the stakes
intensified regarding visitors wanting to see Holocaust sites in Poland. This expanded the
audience for dark imagery and narratives vilifying Poland far beyond the American Jewish
community. Among the sites in Poland that saw an uptick in visitors post-Schindler was the
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Memorial Museum—the site of the former concentration camp.
Tourism to Auschwitz has a long, storied history that is vital to understanding visitors encounters
with Poland. Together, these studies allow us to analyze what exactly is at stake for Poland and
their international reputation as they work to write and right their history on an international
stage.
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I.

The Beginnings of American Jewish Holocaust Tourism
In 1969, long before March of the Living or day school trips to Poland and Israel, the

American Jewish Congress urged the American Jewish community to visit Poland and Europe
more broadly to pay respect to the masses of Jews killed in the Holocaust. The guidebook built
upon knowledge that American Jews already held about the events of World War II and the
Holocaust, and it responded to the organized community’s chatter at the time about using
Holocaust memory and education as a way to bind together an increasingly more casually
associated community and tradition. What was new was the prospect of deliberately traveling to
visit the sites of mass atrocity. Before and during the war, American newspapers printed detailed,
gruesome accounts and photographs of the rising anti-Semitism and ultimately genocide that
took place in Europe at the hands of the Nazis as it happened. Readers of papers as central as The
New York Times and as far off as the smaller Portland Press Herald and Waterville Sentinel saw
repeated wartime coverage relating to Jewish persecution in the 1930s and 1940s. A front-page
headline in Maine’s Portland Press Herald on November 23, 1938—following Kristallnacht but
before the outbreak of World War II—included the phrase “Exterminate Jews By ‘Fire and
Sword,’” and the sub-headline explained, “Nazi leaders called into secret session: Plan Revealed
To Hound Jewish People, Make Criminals Out Of Them And Then Liquidate Them.”72 This
shows that Americans received news with serious implications. Words such as “exterminate” and
“liquidate” are grave, urgent, and carry heavy weight. Indeed, it was before, during, and after the
war that newspapers in the United States ran stories on the specific situation of the Jews facing
systematic persecution in Europe. Portland Press Herald readers knew of extreme losses to the
Jewish community as early as 1944 when the paper ran an Associated Press piece in December
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with the headline, “World Jewish War Losses 6,000,000,” and a line noting that was
approximately one-third of the pre-war Jewish population.73
Nor did the Holocaust receive little attention in the decades after the war. It is not as
though the American Jewish community was not aware of or not thinking or talking about the
Holocaust; there was no sort of silent period of pause in the years between 1945 and 1969 when
the first war-related, American Jewish community-oriented Holocaust tourism guidebook came
on the market. This is an important argument made by Hasia Diner in her book We Remember
With Reverence And Love. Diner draws on archival material from Jewish summer camps in the
1950s including an essay by a high school student named Sharon Feinman in her camp literary
magazine. Feinman wrote of the “master race,” of the “murdered six million Jews,” and yet had
hope for her future.74 Additionally, Diner shows that “books and articles, sermons and literary
works, liturgies and letters to public officials written by so many of the adults who ran Jewish
institutions, staffed the organizations, officiated at synagogues, and published Jewish newspapers
and magazines…blended a deeply felt anguish over this very particular Jewish tragedy with
concerns for humanity writ large.”75 American Jews in this time were not silent; they were not
oblivious; and although they were not traveling to Poland or to Europe with the direct mission of
memorializing Jewish victims of World War II, those perished Jews certainly held a place in
their community’s consciousness.
The American Jewish Congress in particular was in a unique position to leverage what
was on the minds of American Jews at any given moment in time and put it toward actionable
goals to sustain the community’s identity and place within the international social order. It is not
a coincidence that the American Jewish Congress published a guidebook in 1969, a short
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pamphlet-style book encouraging visitation to Holocaust sites across Europe entitled, In
Everlasting Remembrance: A Guide to Memorials and Monuments Honoring the Six Million. In
a paper advertisement for the guide, the American Jewish Congress borrowed directly from the
guide’s introduction in insinuating that American Jewish vacationers should go out of their way
to visit the places where European Jewry suffered catastrophe by “recall[ing] the particulars of
the Holocaust by his presence at the actual sites.”76
To publish the guidebook in 1969 was, I argue, in part a move they made as a result of
the 1967 Six-Day War; without that war and its imprint on the American Jewish consciousness,
American Jewry likely would not have been keen to pick up and travel specifically to Holocaust
memorial sites as early as the 1960s. In June 1967, Israel went to war against neighbors Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria by launching preemptive strikes against the Egyptian air force after reports
confirmed a military threat to Israel. The days were intense and terrifying for American Jews
who watched from afar and worried that they might see the second mass slaughter of
international Jewry in their lifetimes. The war lasted from June 5th until the 10th, and on the third
day The New York Times reported that a luncheon hosted by the United Jewish Appeal saw “$15
million pledged in 15 minutes.”77 The war touched the hearts of American Jews, and they
showed it with their actions and their dollars. There are many arguments to explain why the SixDay War saw such support from Jews in the United States, and some of those arguments involve
most centrally the events of the Holocaust two decades prior. In his book Beyond Auschwitz:
Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought in America, Michael L. Morgan explains that American Jewry
felt acute guilt over not acting during the Holocaust.78 As the Six Day War took place, “…there
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appeared a way of working through that evil and that darkness and transcending it, in a sense.”79
Transcending the darkness led to the Holocaust becoming “central to Jewish identity for many
American Jews and, to a certain degree, to American Jewry as a whole,” he argues. “Surely the
War contributed to this efflorescence; at least it enabled feelings to be expressed and coped with
that had, prior to 1967, disposed of Auschwitz by restricting it to a dark, secluded corner of
American Jewish consciousness.”80 The Six Day War and its effects on American Jews likely led
to the publication of the Holocaust memorial guidebook as a way to deepen Jewish communal
identity and unity through acting on feelings of guilt by channeling support for an easily
identifiable cause.
The guidebook, In Everlasting Remembrance: A Guide to Memorials and Monuments
Honoring the Six Million, is a document imploring shared identity building through
understanding and memory, not vengeance. The purpose of the visits to the sites listed was—
importantly—not to take “a vow of hate toward the murderers [and not to hold] a feeling of
shame that a crime of such enormity should have taken place in our own time.”81 The American
Jewish Congress wanted American Jews to know that the Nazi and the world’s disdain for Jews
was not limited to European Jewry—that American Jews, too, stood to be victims. The Nazi
crusade against Jews was ultimately a universal one and though American Jews were not
Holocaust victims, they were not outside of Nazi ideology and imagination.82 The guidebook
invoked gruesome imagery from the Holocaust of what European Jews went through, noting
“that [any and all Jews] own children were led into the gas chamber; that his own teeth were
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picked over for the gold he had in his mouth.”83 While the stated purpose of the guidebook was
not explicitly to vilify Poland as the geographic space in which the most well-known camps and
ghettos resided, the wording and features on the pages of monuments and memorials in Poland
are stark. A line in the guidebook such as “All of Poland is a Jewish memorial”84 is the direct
antithesis to the way Poland classified—and into the contemporary moment, wants to classify—
itself on the international stage.
There is a line from the book’s introduction and advertisement copy that encapsulates the
main idea of the publication: “But it is not enough to weep for the dead. There is work to be done
for the living. The antonym for Auschwitz is justice—justice here, freedom now—not for
ourselves alone but for every man who is our brother.”85 In seeking justice, the American Jewish
Congress is not referring to any sort of vengeance against Poland or any Germans, not asking for
reparations, and not interested in rehashing the past. Instead, they are invoking reacting to the
dark past by working to make a brighter future for other oppressed groups. In this particular case,
in 1969, they are asking readers to become involved or build upon existing involvement in the
Civil Rights movements sweeping the United States given the period’s ties between the Jewish
and African-American communities. The paragraph before this call to action refers to weeping
for and crying with other oppressed groups, particularly those persecuted under Adolf Hitler such
as Gypsies. A non-comprehensive list of ideas to expand the scope of what it means to weep for
and fight for justice with various groups is offered: “The answer must be clear: we weep for the
Gypsies, for the American Indian, for the black man in South Africa and the Negro sharecropper
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in America and every person whose dignity as a human being has been denied him.”86 The
overall message and takeaway of the guidebook is not one of vilifying any person, or blaming
any group, or boycotting any place; rather, it is a forward-looking, uplifting, call to action to
make the world a better place. Scholar Atina Grossmann, in a piece tracing American Jewish
political discourse of the 1960s, quoted Bob Ross, then a student at University of Michigan, who
explained “he had originally joined the picket line boycotting a segregated Woolworth’s lunch
counter because ‘It was the Jewish thing. If you’re silent, you’re complicit.’” 87 In other words:
American Jews were not concerned with vilifying Poles or Poland as a land of death, not
concerned with casting shame or invoking guilt on any group other than themselves. Silence and
standing by in the face of injustice would never again be an option.
A post-it note on the advertisement for the guidebook, found in an archival folder categorized
by the years 1993-4, says, “Note – this guide is no longer available. 8/14/93.”88 Perhaps the
guidebook was taken off of the market because it was outdated, or perhaps the American Jewish
Congress knew that phrases equating Poland in its entirety with a land of Jewish ashes would not
improve relations with Poland as they emerged fresh out of the confines of Soviet rule. Nothing
in the archive provided reasoning for what might have been a sudden halt to the guidebook sales.
Regardless, American Jewish tourism to Poland did not stop in 1993 when the guidebook went
off the market—in fact, it picked up in intensity following the release that year of Steven
Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List.
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II.

Entering Mainstream America: Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List
I underestimated the renown of Schindler’s List until I spent the summer working in the

heart of Kraków’s Jewish quarter, the neighborhood in which it was filmed. Of all there is to see
in Kraków—and there is a lot—tourists want to experience and bear witness to the origins of a
film that clearly left a mark on most of them. Oskar Schindler’s factory is a tourist attraction so
popular that in working the reception desk at the Galicia Jewish Museum I was asked multiple
times per shift by visitors to direct them to the factory. Could they still get tickets? (You
typically have to reserve tickets in advance.) How far were we located from the museum? (Just
across the river.) The factory-turned-museum is so overrun with visitors that a fellow summer
expat to Kraków encouraged me not to take my visiting family there, reasoning, “it’s just not
worth it.”
Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List was a smashing success financially. Following Oskar
Schindler, a German businessman who went to Kraków to profit from the war, the film tells the
story of Schindler staffing his metal pot factory with Jews. He originally hired Jews because they
were the cheapest labor he could find. Yet Schindler becomes concerned for them as persecution
of Jews picks up in intensity, and the film is a story of the redemption of a German man.
Schindler becomes a hero when he saves more than 1,000 Jews from their death. The movie
brought in $321 million worldwide—“an unheard-of sum for a movie about the Holocaust”89—
and within two months of its U.S. release it sold 7.5 million tickets. Historian Tim Cole notes
that “US President Bill Clinton urged people to watch Schindler’s List, as did TV chat show host
Oprah Winfrey who told viewers that watching the movie had made her ‘a better person.’”90 It is
not every day that a sitting president urges a nation to watch a film, nor is it common for a
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world-famous talk show host to declare herself a changed person thanks to a long movie. NBC
played Schindler’s List, a film running over three hours, in a primetime showing without
commercial breaks in 1997 and 65 million people are estimated to have viewed it on television
alone.91 “For Germany and the UK,” wrote scholars Christoph Classen and Kirsten Wachter,
“possibly one-third and one-quarter of the populations, respectively, saw the movie.”92 This was
not just any movie that the masses were watching. Schindler’s List director Spielberg classified
the movie not as entertainment but as “a document” of history.93 Cole argued the film occupied
dangerous territory where viewers were likely to interpret it as a primary source.94 And herein
lies the problem: Schindler’s List came across in many ways as a documentary when it was not.
“For the most part, the film tells its story in isolation, as if nothing else was happening at
the time in Poland,” Andrew Nagorski, a former Warsaw bureau chief for Newsweek wrote.
“Poland, even Kraków outside the ghetto, barely exists. Uninformed viewers, which include
many young Americans, may emerge from the film with no idea that the war was aimed at more
than the destruction of the Jews or that there were other victims of Nazi atrocities.”95 He uses his
article to detail the nuances in the history of Polish-Jewish relations that Spielberg could have
used in his film, highlighting especially Polish Jewish and Catholic relations. The images
Spielberg uses of Polish Catholics “seem to suggest that the only roles Poles played was to
applaud Nazi terror.”96 Schindler’s List, Nagorski points out, was not entirely a Spielberg
original: the film adapted Thomas Keneally’s book of historical fiction, Schindler’s Ark. And the
book indeed highlighted the nuances of the Polish Jewish-Catholic relationships, describing “the
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important role of a Polish Catholic who risked his life by acting as a liaison between Jews inside
and outside the ghetto.”97 There is no Polish Catholic acting as a liaison between the Jews on the
inside and the world on the outside of the ghetto Schindler’s List. This is to say, Spielberg made
a distinct choice to make a film of the redemption of a German man on Polish soil without
coloring the narrative on the Polish side of things.
One of Spielberg’s primary goals in making Schindler’s List, Gary Weissman notes in his
scholarship on the movie, “was to educate high school students about the Holocaust, which ‘had
been treated as just a footnote in so many textbooks or not mentioned at all.’”98 Spielberg’s
choice to film nearly the entire film in black and white added to the movie’s presentation as more
documentary than “based on a true story.” Film critics explained:
For Spielberg himself, filming in monochrome was clearly a matter of authenticity…part
of the realist style of his desire for history, for a film that would be “true” to the record.
For an audience it works ambiguously. In one way, it distances: it marks this particular
past as different, as elsewhere, as “another country.” But in another way, it reduces
distance: our images of the Holocaust are constructed in black and white, whether from
newsreel or photographs, and the film resonates with this existing archive of
representation; it places us immediately into that place of memory.99
Black and white movies, Spielberg explained in a Los Angeles Times cover story profiling the
film’s release, did not typically sell well to television networks or on video cassette. He had to
push—hard—to make the movie this way. “…I pleaded my case and said this movie would be a
Band-Aid in color, and more of a tourniquet in black-and-white,” Spielberg told the L.A.
Times.100 This evidence shows that Spielberg made the movie with a purpose, a mission—
something more in mind than simply making money. Yet, according to scholars Geoff Eley and
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Atina Grossmann, “the success of historical movies does not necessarily correlate with empirical
historical truth.”101 Historical truth looks different to all parties involved in the case of World
War II in Poland, a phenomenon explored in-depth in the following chapter, but this assertion is
still an important one. The success of Schindler’s List is so great in magnitude that it is all too
easy to forget that the narratives and images moviegoers take away from it are precisely the
narratives and images that Poland, thrust into the movie’s spotlight, wants to avoid.
About twenty minutes in to Schindler’s List is a disturbing scene. Jews pack up their
belongings under German supervision and walk down a street and into the Kraków Ghetto where
they are forced to reside. As the (Polish) Jews make their way, they walk through (Catholic)
Poles who have lined the streets and are screaming, throwing dirt, hitting them. The camera pans
to one young, blonde, Polish girl in particular who cries out multiple times with anger and hatred
evident in her voice, “Goodbye, Jews!”102 This scene clues the viewer in to an underlying
possible interpretation of the movie: Poles hate Jews, so much so that even a young girl has
learned to hate them. And yet as the film rolls on, it becomes clear that to be Polish and to be
Jewish are not completely separate identities. The camera moves inside a ghetto apartment,
following a Jewish family as they move into a now-shared apartment already occupied by
another family. “Dzień dobry,” the Jews say to one another as they file into the tiny room. Dzień
dobry is not Yiddish—an insular language of Eastern European Jewry—but Polish, the common
secular vernacular, for “good day.” Fleeting Polish is heard elsewhere among Jews in the movie,
too, when a photographer is putting people together for a photo and is heard saying, “prozę,” the
Polish word for “please.”103 We saw in the previous chapter how Polish historiography separates
Polish and Jewish identities, so it is worth noting that Spielberg’s movie conflates the two. In
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doing so, the movie portrays the non-Jewish Poles as the ones full of hate toward Jews. It is the
German businessman, Oskar Schindler, who saves the day by saving Jews from their
surroundings in (Nazi-occupied) Poland. The film does not shy away, however, from the
atrocious actions of German soldiers. There is no question that there are no redeeming moments
for the Nazis yet non-Jewish Poles do not see redemption either. As Nagorski notes in his
Foreign Affairs article, more Poles than any other nationality have been awarded the title
Righteous Among the Nations from Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust authority, and that only
accounts for documented cases of Poles risking or giving their life to save the life of Jews since a
requirement to be bestowed the title is that one risked or gave their life to save a Jew.104 This is
particularly significant because “in occupied Western Europe and even within Germany itself,
people who hid Jews faced possible arrest; only in Poland did those people—and even their
entire families—who sheltered Jews face death.”105 Yet Schindler’s List and the publicity
surrounding the movie repeatedly focused on the story of German redemption while leaving
Poles in the role of victimizer and Poland in the role of land of ashes.

III.

Selling Schindler’s List to the Public
Among the news clippings saved in the Richard A. Cohen Associates archival folders, the

firm who oversaw the publicity for the 1993 Schindler’s List release, was a cover story for the
weekend edition of the Los Angeles Times. Written by David Gritten and titled “SPIELBERG
TACKLES HELL ON EARTH: On location in Kraków, Poland, with Steven Spielberg as he makes

‘Schindler’s List,’” it featured a quote from the film’s Polish cinematographer. In introducing
Janusz Kaminski, Gritten qualifies him, noting Kaminski “has lived in America since 1980 [and]
says flatly he now dislikes his native land, which he thinks has an ‘inferiority complex.’
104
105
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[Kaminski says,] ‘The fact is, some Poles were traitors and sent Jews to their deaths [a]nd Poland
is still an anti-Semitic place.’”106 In addition to this biting remark on Polish national perceptions
of themselves, the article also features a quote from a Polish consultant on Schindler’s List,
Franciszek Palowski, who explained that the book upon which the movie was based caused
tension in Poland. “The book destroys the cliché that existed in Poland that there were no good
Germans. There’s also a jealousy here, I think. Poles take the view that no one ever wrote a book
about Poles who saved Jews.”107 There are in fact books written about Poles who saved Jews.
Nechama Tec, a prominent child survivor of the Holocaust who became a notable scholar,
published When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland
in 1986 with Oxford University Press. A New York Times review noted, “What is unusual about
this book is that it both emphasizes Polish rescue efforts and reveals a ubiquitous hostility toward
Jews.”108 There simply is no way to address Polish-Jewish relations without discussion of antiSemitism, and it is peculiar a book harnessing both generous Polish actions in wartime and the
hostility some Poles showed toward Jews did not seem to qualify as a book that simply shared
stories of Poles who saved Jews.
This Los Angeles Times piece had another element unflattering to Poland: encounters the
film’s cast and crew had with something that “alarmed and surprised [them]” which was the antiSemitism that some hostile Poles expressed toward them while filming. Writer David Gritten
describes three specific incidents relayed to him by the cast and crew. The first took place when
actor Ralph Fiennes, who played SS commander Amon Goeth of Płaszów, the concentration
camp featured in the film, was in costume on the set. “A woman came up to me,” he recounted
“and said in Polish that the Germans were wonderful people, and that they didn’t kill anyone
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who didn’t deserve it.”109 Another time, a woman walked onto the set and when members of the
crew went to stop her, she yelled, “Who cares about the [expletive] Jews?”110 The third and final
incident, classified as the “worst of all,” happened when “an elderly Polish man approached one
of the cast’s Israeli actors in his hotel bar, and asked if he was Jewish. When he was told yes, the
old man insultingly drew his finger across his throat, then pulled his fist up behind his neck to
indicate a noose. Ben Kingsley [British actor playing Itzhak Stern]…saw the incident, leaped at
the man, and a scuffle ensued.”111 These anecdotes in this article are significant because they
contribute to the narrative of Poland as a place and Poles as a people as wholly intertwined with
anti-Semitism, with revisionist feelings about the Second World War, and without sympathy for
the Jewish experience in Poland. These incidents are in line with narratives of Jewish suffering
but not in line with narratives of Polish suffering in the war. This attention to one narrative over
the other is what the controversies surrounding the history of the Second World War in Poland
are all about, and they play out not just in historiographies but in popular newspaper articles and
films, too.
An interesting connection and tension to tease out—though not necessarily a
correlation—is that an American Jewish public relations firm handled the publicity for
Schindler’s List. The Richard A. Cohen Associates, a former public relations firm whose records
are now housed at the American Jewish Historical Society, arranged and oversaw the on-location
media coverage for the film such as the Los Angeles Times piece. Media coverage for the film
was not limited to California. A publicity calendar for the film shows that they spent time
publicizing the movie all around the world—notes on articles in the Los Angeles Times sat
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alongside notes marking the days Schindler’s List stories would run in Der Spiegel, a German
newspaper, as well as the BBC, news outlets in Croatia and Australia, and the French
L’Express.112 An annotated list of media outlets interested in covering the filming and release of
Schindler’s List shows that the Richard Cohen Associates turned down the vast majority of
inquiries, including twelve out of thirteen requests from media outlets across Poland. To turn
down so many Polish outlets demonstrates that Poles were not the target audience of the film and
they were decidedly not relevant to any efforts to publicize the film—my own interpretation
being the filmmakers were not interested in Polish pushback on their work. Spielberg gave one
interview to Cracow TV until the public relations firm’s associate realized the channel “had
hidden cameras at many locations that drove production crazy,” she wrote. “[They] were the
bane of my existence while in Krakow.”113 This addendum helps demonstrate that it was not a
machine or an algorithm deciding on who could cover the movie’s presence in Poland or what
story they could tell—it was people. People who became annoyed, who had favorites, who were,
in all likelihood, completely wrapped up in the emotional world of the film, the scenes of Polish
hatred, the arc of German redemption. People attuned to anti-Semitism and not anti-Polonism.
The unanswerable question is why exactly Spielberg included no Polish suffering or redemption
in the film, why one German man saw hero status, why Poles and Poland were nothing more
than the backdrop of the film, why so much of the nuance of Thomas Keneally’s Booker Prize
winning novel Schindler’s Ark was lost.
Through the successful efforts of the Richard A. Cohen Associates publicity and the
film’s striking effect on its viewers, Schindler’s List put Kraków, Poland, on the map—and on
the travel radar—for many American Jews. A Jerusalem Post article from November 1994 titled,
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“The City ‘Schindler’s List’ made famous,” classified Kraków as “Poland’s most beautiful city”
and the home of an “ancient Main Market Square [that] is one of the most charming in
Europe.”114 Yet the reason for Kraków’s tourism business, the article explained, is because
“[Schindler’s List] put Cracow on the world tourism map, bringing in its wake waves of visitors
who tour the city on Oskar Schindler’s trail, along the movie’s location sites: Schindler’s factory;
the Jewish Ghetto; the Stara Boznica Synagogue, whose entire congregation was shot by the
Nazis; and the local Gestapo headquarters.”115 To have a critical mass of tourists entering into
Poland through Holocaust tourism, to trace the steps of a redeemed German man, to enter into a
country under the guise of Jewish death as opposed to the centuries of thriving Jewish life—all
of this is to understand Poland as a nation and a people in the ways they are not looking to be
understood. Andrew Nagorski noted that since World War II, the debate over Polish history “can
be reduced to two (simplified) opposing views.” Polish Catholics, on one hand, draw attention
to:
Poland’s long record as a land of refuge for Jews, beginning with the great migrations of
Jews fleeing persecution in other parts of Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, as a land of tolerance, where Jews were sometimes granted special privileges
by Polish monarchs and nobles. Jews, on the other hand, often emphasized the steady
growth of anti-Semitism in Polish society, especially when Poland reemerged as an
independent state between the world wars.116
The tension between narratives surrounding Jewish life in Poland is exacerbated when tourists
and visitors to Poland enter into learning about the nation’s history through the lens of tours that
claim to follow in the steps of, for instance, Oskar Schindler. For all the attention that
Schindler’s List brought to Poland—and it brought a lot—it brought the precise kind of attention
that Poland did not want: attention to Poland as a land of Jewish death.
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An example of the Polish national focus on Poland as a land of Jewish refuge prior to the
twentieth century is in the official notes of an Israeli delegation’s visit to Poland. Then Minister
of Finance of Israel, Shimon Peres, visited Poland in the last week of November 1989. A
confidential memo put together after his visit and delivered to the American Jewish Congress—
the organization representing American Jewish interests all over the world—stated, “Great
emphasis was placed on the common history and what [the Poles] often referred to as ‘A
thousand years of coexistence’ as opposed to the bitter memories of the more recent past.”117
“Coexistence” in particular implies difference and tolerance, not necessarily commonalities or
acceptance. To have such a line included in a report from an international Jewish community to
the American Jewish Congress illuminates the obviousness with which Polish attention is
dedicated to reading particular moments in Polish-Jewish history through a revisionist lens, a
lens separating out instances of suffering of Jews at the hands of Poles. This tactic of stressing
the importance of focusing on particular moments in history is a phenomenon we will see
increase and intensify with time in the following chapter.

IV.

The Schindler’s Narrative in Polish Hands

We have seen the ways in which the story of Schindler’s List, as an example of a Holocaust
narrative in American Jewish hands, invokes an image of Jewish suffering and death in present
day Poland. But how does that story change when the story of Oskar Schindler is in Polish
hands? In 2010, the factory Schindler and his Jewish employees used in Kraków opened to the
public as a museum. The Historical Museum of the City of Kraków, a municipal organization
and museum dating back to the nineteenth century, funded and facilitated the conversion from
wartime factory to contemporary museum. For context, in December 1945, the City National
Peres Visit to Poland, American Jewish Congress, records; I-77; box 634; folder 8; American Jewish Historical
Society, New York, NY.
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Council passed a proposition stating that the Historical Museum of the City of Kraków was an
“independent and self-managed city branch, its aim…gathering and proper protection of all
historical materials related to life and culture of Kraków since the first ages of the city’s history
till the current time, as well as development of science, research, and education activities.”118 It
is significant, then, that the present day Schindler’s Enamel Factory Museum features
prominently the stories not necessarily of Polish Jewish suffering but of the suffering of all of
Kraków while under occupation in the Second World War. All of Kraków did not suffer or
escape suffering at the site of Schindler’s enamel factory: Jews did. Why not set up a museum
about the suffering of all of Kraków at a site such as the former Gestapo headquarters?
A glance at the TripAdvisor page, an extremely popular website for tourists to leave
reviews of sites and hotels around the world, for Schindler’s Enamel Factory Museum features
many positive reviews, to be expected of a multi-million-dollar, contemporary museum project,
as well as more peculiar reviews. Visitors from all over the world noted that they expected the
museum to focus heavily, if not exclusively, on the stories of Oskar Schindler and the Jews he
saved. Yet that is not the focus of the museum’s exhibit. “An informative museum but not what I
was expecting,”119 one review began, while another explained, “Like most people have said it
was more about the war and how it effected [sic] Poland than the factory but very
interesting…”120 There exists a disconnect between what tourists to the Schindler’s Factory
Museum expect to see when they visit the museum and what they actually see. Given the
enormous popularity of Schindler’s List, it makes sense that visitors would associate
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contemporary Kraków with the film itself and presume they would see, at least in part, artifacts
and narratives from the film’s deceivingly historical scenes on display in the Schindler’s Factory
Museum. But this is part of the problem Poland sees itself as facing: visitors come thinking too
much about Jewish suffering on Polish soil and about a redeemed German man, even hero. For
Poland, Poles suffered immensely at the hands of Germany and so to focus international
attention to a single case of German redemption on Polish soil is completely problematic.
One of the main historians behind the creation of the museum and its exhibitions, Dr.
Edyta Gawron of Jagiellonian University in Kraków, told the New York Times, “[Schindler’s
Factory is] a museum of the occupation that shows what the wartime experience was like in
Krakow and shows the context of all the stories – of Jews in Krakow, of Oskar Schindler, of
Cracovians, of the German occupiers.”121 She is right: the museum does talk about all stories,
including those belonging to Jews. It is just that Polish Jews are not the primary focus, as the
exhibit title—Kraków Under Nazi Occupation, 1939-1945—indicates. This exhibit is an example
of a wartime, Holocaust-related narrative over which Poland has near total control. A municipal
museum organized and runs the Factory Museum, and it is a chance for Poland to counter the
narratives put forth by Steven Spielberg and Schindler’s List. And this is not the only example of
a Polish institution trying to correct the record after the runaway success of Schindler’s List and
the runaway anti-Polish narratives it instilled in those who watched it.

V.

Auschwitz Then, Auschwitz Now
When tourists visit Poland—regardless of whether or not they are Jewish, have

encountered Schindler’s List, or have learned about the Holocaust—a major attraction is
Auschwitz. Since 2016, over two million people have visited Auschwitz each year. It is difficult
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to walk far in Kraków without encountering some sort of advertisement for any number of tour
operators who run buses from the city of Kraków to the town of Oświęcim where Auschwitz is
located about an hour away. With the exceptions of the years 1999-2003, attendance to
Auschwitz steadily increased beginning in 1993 when Schindler’s List came out. Correlation
does not equal causation, of course, but there is evidence to suggest that even if people were not
actually entering into the grounds of Auschwitz, they were talking about it all across the world.
In 1996, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial Museum released its first ever bulletin
newsletter in Polish and English. It might seem standard for any sort of national museum with a
wide following to send out some sort of periodical with updates, notes, and the like, but the
Auschwitz bulletin came about for a peculiar reason at a peculiar time. Part of the introduction
on the first page reads:
The mass media in Poland and abroad has devoted considerable attention to these
problems, and to others associated with…the number of victims at the camp [for example].
Information on the history of the Auschwitz concentration camp and the current problems of the
Museum has not always been accurate or sufficiently comprehensive, nor have journalists always
turned to the most competent authorities. There have been instances of conscious distortion or
even downright mendacity. Apart from these, the museum has also frequently failed to supply
current information. In order to avoid such difficulties, the International Council of the Museum
has proposed the publication of a special bulletin for the Polish and international media, and for
official and scholarly institutions.122
It is significant that in 1996 an official Polish institution called out the international media for its
inaccurate reporting or what it deems “conscious distortion or even downright mendacity.” This
shows that Polish authorities were aware that all eyes were on Auschwitz—and, along with that,
on the stories of Jewish suffering that took place there. The problem about the number of victims
at Auschwitz mentioned in the introductory text refers to an ongoing dispute about the number of
Jews who died at Auschwitz in relation to the number of Poles (meant here as Polish Catholics
and not Polish Jews) who died at Auschwitz. The official Auschwitz death toll is approximately
Wacław Długoborski, “Museum and Memorial Auschwitz-Birkenau Oświęcim, Poland,” bulletin no. 1, AugSept. 1996. Leo Baeck Institute, The Center for Jewish History, C125. (unsure how to cite this)
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1.1 million deaths, 90% of those deaths being Jewish deaths—though not only Polish Jews.123
The best estimates of demographics within the camp according to the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, which utilizes up-to-date scholarship, are that approximately 1,095,00 Jews
were deported to Auschwitz and 960,000 died and 140,000-150,000 non-Jewish Poles were
deported to Auschwitz and 74,000 died.124
A 1992 article in the Chicago Tribune provides an important account of the issue of death
tolls at Auschwitz. The article quotes Miles Lerner, the then-chairman of international relations
for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council—the council responsible for the creation of the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum—who said, “The numbers that we dealt with before were
numbers that were politically motivated.”125 During the years of communism in Poland, the
politically motivated myth circulated that over one million non-Jewish Poles were killed in
Auschwitz. Historian Tim Cole puts it this way: “The competing interests of the Soviet liberators
and the Polish survivors of Auschwitz led to tension over whose story would be told—and whose
story would be suppressed.”126 As a result, it was a big deal when, in 1992, the AuschwitzBirkenau Memorial Museum updated their exhibits to reflect the true numbers and the fact that
Auschwitz was primarily a site of Jewish death.127 All of this matters because it shows the ways
that narratives and facts have shifted throughout Polish history—primarily in ways that
privileged Polish suffering over Jewish suffering—and when these shifts came to light on the
international stage through phenomena such as the effects of Schindler’s List, Poland had to
respond and right the matters.
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Jews have encountered Poland as we know it today in one way or another since they were
welcomed with open arms as they fled persecution in the eleventh century. At one point, Poland
was home to the world’s thriving center of Jewish life: incredible scholarship, music, prayer, and
culture emerged from Polish-Jewish communities. As such, it is much too simple for Jews,
American Jews in particular, to encounter Poland today only through, say, a March of the Living
trip where they are told misleading and manipulative “facts” like that surrounding the legacy of
Majdanek without addressing the long, storied, complex histories of Jews in Poland. Likewise, it
is too simple to take Spielberg’s Schindler’s List or the City of Kraków’s Factory Museum at
their face values. Simplicity is perhaps the enemy of history. Histories are complex—particularly
when suffering is involved—and it is worth ensuring the stories are told in their fullness. When I
think back to the education I received growing up, it’s this kind of nuanced, complex look at the
past I wish I had. Whether American Jews erasing aspects of history flattering to Poland, or
Poland erasing aspects of history regarding Jewish suffering at the hands of Poles, approaching
history from a revisionist standpoint is deeply problematic in any manner. A deep exploration of
this topic is to where this thesis now turns.
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CHAPTER THREE
It Must Be Remembered and It Should Be Stressed:
Polish Institutions and the Fight for Historical Truth
It is the middle of February, and I am in the depths of research and writing for this
project. I notice on Facebook that many of my friends and colleagues from the Galicia Jewish
Museum this summer are circulating a petition with notes of disdain and worry attached to their
posts. The title of the petition immediately catches my eye, as it relates to Dr. Dariusz Stola, a
renowned scholar upon whose work this chapter is based. “Keep Prof. Dariusz Stola as the
Director of POLIN – Museum of the History of Polish Jews!” the petition reads; within a day of
its launch it gathered over 2000 signatures. News had just come out that the Polish Minister of
Culture would not renew Dr. Stola’s contract at the end of the month. The Minister of Culture,
Piotr Gliński, is an appointment of the right-wing, nationalist party currently in power: Law and
Justice, more commonly known by its Polish acronym PiS. He had been outspoken in his
criticism of Dr. Stola’s tenure at the Jewish history museum because of an exhibit Dr. Stola
oversaw which drew connections between the 1968 anti-Semitic purge in Poland and the Polish
political climate of 2018. Instead of renewing Stola’s contract, Gliński said he would instead
open the position up for applications and Dr. Stola could submit one for consideration.128 Groups
and people came to Dr. Stola’s defense, ranging from the Mayor of Warsaw to the Jewish
Historical Institute Association, and there has been outrage from the international community
deeply aware of and committed to Dr. Stola’s work and integrity.
In reading about the controversy surrounding Dr. Stola and what might become of
POLIN—Museum of the History of Polish Jews, by all accounts the world’s premiere museum

Tomasz Urzykowski, “Minister kultury nie przedłużył kontraktu dyrektorowi Muzeum Polin. Co planuje Gliński?” Gazeta
Wyborcza, Warsaw, Feb. 16, 2019.
128

53

dedicated to Polish-Jewish history—129the George Orwell quote from 1984 came to mind: He
who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past.
At the essence of George Orwell’s eminent novel 1984 is the importance of language in
shaping thoughts. Orwell employs various fictional ministries—named using “doublespeak” in
which words undermine the meanings typically associated with them—to illustrate the link
between language and thought. Prisoners and enemies of the government are tortured in the
Ministry of Love, and food is heavily rationed by the Ministry of Plenty. Most relevant to any
discussion of history is the Ministry of Truth: home to propaganda creation and oversight of
history, education, and news.
It is the Orwellian Ministry of Truth which Dariusz Stola, a widely published and
respected historian, professor, and director of the acclaimed POLIN Museum of the History of
Polish Jews, invokes in his contribution to The Convolutions of Historical Politics titled,
“Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance: A Ministry of Memory?” Stola lays out the
history of the Institute of National Remembrance (in Polish: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, or
IPN). When Poland broke from the Eastern bloc in 1989, a major issue arose: how to interpret
the past. In Poland, interpreting the past existed hand in hand with uncovering the past,
particularly the communist past. Secret police and state archives were left over from decades of
Soviet rule, and Poland needed to take care of them. Stola winds his way through the nearly ten
years of bitter, partisan political battles that ensued until late 1998 when the Sejm—the lower
Polish house of parliament—voted to pass the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance. It
took another 18 months before the Sejm “finally appointed IPN president, which was
prerequisite for any institution building to start,” and in late 2000, IPN president Leon Kieres
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began hiring staff.130 The legal document of the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance
sets the tone for the institution and its work, opening with a section titled, “Bearing in mind,”
which contextualizes the following articles and sections. “Bearing in mind: …the patriotic
tradition of the struggle of the Polish people against the occupiers, the Nazism and
communism…” the act reads, listing other reasoning for the establishment of the Institute before
closing with, “as an expression of our belief that no unlawful action by the state against the
citizens can be guarded as classified or left to oblivion – the following shall apply.”131 From its
conception, the IPN was a nationalized entity of the government. In invoking the stories and
emotions of a long national history under occupation, the IPN carves out legitimacy for itself as a
place, a people, and a purpose that can and will change the status quo of what it has meant and
means to remember and be remembered in Poland.
To do so, the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance lays out four main tasks. The
first, in Stola’s words, is “to gather, manage, preserve and make accessible the archives of
Communist security services.”132 The IPN took over all archives relating to Poland’s years under
totalitarian or communist control—90 kilometers of files in total that had to be moved to a
central location.133 This meant they had to build the infrastructure to house, organize, and store
the documents. Stola notes that the mass of files came from a number of institutions with
different systems for organizing the documents, so the IPN had to start from scratch in building a
state archive. At the time Stola published his chapter in 2012—twelve years since the IPN
commenced its work restructuring the files—the files were still in the process of being
reorganized. The third main task of the IPN in its founding was to investigate and prosecute
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major crimes against the Polish nation or individual Polish citizens ranging from the years 19391989; the IPN includes Nazi crimes, communist crimes, crimes against peace or humanity, and
war crimes within the scope of their prosecutors.134 The fourth main task of the IPN is education
and research: researching, publishing, and teaching on the years 1939-1989. In its work of
archival research, publishing, and organizing conferences and a doctoral summer school, the
Public Education Office is the largest organization dedicated to Poland’s contemporary
history.135 The activities of the IPN’s education and research departments, the institution’s
largest, are the focus of this chapter. Of particular importance is the higher standing and reach
the IPN has compared to any other Polish academic institution. Stola writes, “In Poland, IPN
towers above the much poorer academic landscape by its size, budget, number of publications,
official status and focus of the media…Its research budget is most likely bigger than all of the
other research centers combined.”136 IPN influence is staggering and not without issues. Stola
acknowledges threats facing the IPN as of his writing in 2012, the most relevant threat being
senior IPN officials responsible for “insufficient neutrality” in all matters relating to party
politics or indulging in “highly controversial public statements,” as well as public figures
purporting and representing right-wing ideology who “tend to exploit certain representations of
the past to confront their political competitors.”137
All of the important contextual information Stola provides about the founding of the IPN
sets up his argument: though the institution itself is nationalized, the work of the institution is not
out to propagate any sort of national agenda. Stola explains,
In the midst of heated exchanges between [Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance
(IPN)] critics and supporters, such trivial deficiencies as a small reading room,
publications of dubious usefulness or impractical computer catalogue pass unnoticed.
Thus the secret of IPN this paper may reveal is the following: this is indeed a Ministry of
Stola, 50.
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Memory, but not of the Orwellian type. It is a regular continental European bureaucracy,
with usual deficiencies of its kind, and a part of Polish government administration, which
is not famous for its effectiveness.138
While Stola’s reasoning is certainly not unfounded—it took twelve years and counting for
institutional staff to carry out their most essential task of organizing archives—it is no longer
accurate. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance is a Ministry of Memory and indeed it is
now of the Orwellian type. In examining three case studies, this chapter will demonstrate how,
since 2012, the IPN used language to shape thoughts in order to support a specific revisionist
interpretation of history. The history they purport does not hold Poland responsible for anything
that took place on Polish soil during World War II, the reasoning being that Poland must be
exempt from the responsibility of the actions of its occupiers. This is particularly acute in the
first case study, an exploration of the IPN’s “Truth About Camps” campaign, as well as in the
second case study examining the Polish League Against Defamation—a nongovernmental
organization with very strong governmental ties. And, finally, this chapter will analyze the IPN’s
own publications featuring the writing of Polish history by IPN-employed historians with an eye
toward their Orwellian characteristics and the response from American Jewry that followed.

I.

Truth About Camps

Open up www.truthaboutcamps.eu in your web browser and you are transported to a dark,
eerie page. Barbed wire and electric fences make up the background image and appear to stretch
far beyond what the eye can see. A message appears in seven languages: “WARNING! This site
contains drastic and graphic material. Are you sure you want to enter?” Choose “yes” and a new
page loads: atop the page sits an image of the notorious “ARBEIT MACHT FREI” sign at the
entrance to Auschwitz I. Below the German phrase is a menu, highlighted in a deep red, with
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page options ranging from “IT BEGAN IN THE THIRD REICH” to “REPRESSION AGAINST POLES”
to “HOLOCAUST.” It is not immediately apparent who or what is behind this website until one
moves down to the bottom of any page. In the bottom right corner is a small seal and the words
“Institute of National Remembrance” which if clicked directs you to the website of Poland’s
Institute of National Remembrance. The Truth About Camps website contains various texts,
image galleries, and a propaganda video entitled “Words Matter – German Nazi Camps.” What
does the Truth About Camps campaign—the website and all contained within it—say about
IPN’s work to write Polish history? How does the IPN use the campaign to right what they see as
misconceptions of Polish history?
Dr. Sławomir Kalbarczyk, historian and head of the faculty of Polish history until 1945 at the
Institute of National Remembrance, wrote the mission statement of the Truth About Camps
website. The “OUR MISSION” page opens with the phrase, “In the Name of Historical Truth” and
goes on to begin a multi-paragraph mission statement by saying: “The past is an element of the
present.”139 The past matters deeply to Poland, particularly its leaders, and the IPN purports a
specific vision of the past. The Truth About Camps website leaves out any mention of the less
glamorous parts of Polish history during the Nazi occupation: Polish collaboration, murders of
Jews, or taking of Jewish property—tombstones from Jewish cemeteries taken by Poles to pave
their walkways as an example. The kind of historical truth being pursued by Poland through the
IPN is a one-sided revisionist historical truth. The Polish historical truth is not so much a truth
itself as much as it is a response to other historical truths put forward by outsiders: that of
previously discussed Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List and Poland as a land of suffering, for
example, or Jan T. Gross’s Neighbors and Poland as a place in which some Poles needed no
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compelling in order to commit brutal mass murder of their Jewish neighbors. Kalbarczyk’s
mission statement goes on to argue:
The Institute of National Remembrance…whose duty is to disseminate knowledge on
Poland’s recent history, cannot remain indifferent with regard to the fact that this historically
incorrect phrase of “Polish” death or extermination camps, which is so offensive to Poles,
reappears in various speeches and publications. Thus, we have created the “German Camps
in Poland” website within the framework of our mission. Its [sic] clear message is the
historical truth that there were no “Polish” extermination, death, or concentration camps.
Those were German camps, for they were established and managed by the Germans, who
governed occupied Poland through terror.140
In working to right the interpretations of Polish history, the IPN utilizes specific language in
order to change thinking. It is the language of “Polish death camp” with which they are
concerned because of the implications possible from someone—whether informed on the details
of World War II and Poland’s occupation by German and Soviet forces or not—hearing the
phrase as legitimate in any way. In response to one single phrase, three words in total, Poland
created an entire web-based campaign including text, images, and video to combat use of the
phrase.
In fact, the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Memorial and Museum created a software called
Remember: Correcting Memory Errors.141 This software, free to download in sixteen languages,
is “an add-in for all who write, developed to prevent usage of incorrect phrases: ‘Polish death
camps’ or ‘Polish extermination camps.’ The tool finds [the] incorrectly used phrase, underlines
it and suggests correct replacement.”142 The Polish government’s IPN confronts minute everyday
word usage as part of their attempt to propagate history as they want it seen and remembered. It
is too dangerous for students of history to draw their own conclusions as to what should be
remembered and how because, like so much of the darkness in Polish history, it is out of the
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hands of and beyond control of Poles. In turn, Poland utilizes the Truth About Camps website to
explicitly state what they deem memorable. The page titled “POLES UNDER GERMAN
OCCUPATION” illuminates this most clearly. This section discusses how Poles “adopted various

stances during the German occupation” ranging from resistance fighter to forced loyalty to
collaboration and treason. While the IPN is forthcoming about the wide range of roles Poles
played under German occupation, it is the following line where our attention must go: “But it
should be stressed that the negative postures had only an individual dimension.”143 This piece
uses the phrase “should be stressed” four times over the course of the page, all to implore the
reader to focus on the individual. “Hence, it should be stressed even more that in fact a whole lot
of anonymous, common people who listened to their conscience and decided to risk their lives
and help the Jews played a paramount role in rescuing the Jews,” reads one line. Immediately
following reads, “It should be stressed again that the Poles constitute the most numerous group
(over 6,000) awarded with the Righteous among the Nations Medal.”144 Over and over, Poland—
through its historical mouthpiece, the Institute of National Remembrance—utilizes language to
shape thoughts. Stressing factors such as individual choice regarding collaboration with the
Nazis negates the important histories of collaborators as members of the Polish nation. Stressing
the number of Poles who received the Righteous Among the Nations honor is important, but so
too would be stressing the number of Poles who turned a blind eye to deportations of Jews to and
from ghettos. Emphasis on individual identities as separate from the Polish nation only takes
place when an individual committed a crime, yet when one completed a righteous act they are
heralded as indicative of the entire nation. This implication—that the entire Polish nation is
innocent—is as false as any claim that the Polish nation suffered or the Polish nation is
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responsible for anything in World War II. As we know, nations don’t suffer, nations don’t kill,
nations don’t maintain innocence: people do.
To implore people ranging from journalists to civilians to use accurate terminology to
discuss German death camps in occupied Poland is reasonable. History thrives on accuracy, and
it is important that actions (and their consequences) are assigned to their rightful owners. Where
the IPN’s “Truth About Camps” campaign deviates from the reasonable and enters into
dangerous territory is where they use Orwellian tactics to employ a single-issue focus to obscure
or detract from their broader historical revisionism efforts. “Truth About Camps” invokes
sympathy with statements like the following from the Washington D.C. Polish Embassy’s
YouTube video titled “Words Matter.” This video is featured on the “Truth About Camps”
website, and it uses an authoritative narrator set to somber music to deliver the following
message: “Using misleading language obscures the tragedy of millions of Holocaust victims. It’s
not just semantics. It’s a matter of historical integrity and accuracy. Words matter. Remember to
use the correct terms: German Nazi Camps.”145 Words do matter, particularly when they are
being used simultaneously as revisionist efforts to separate instances of Polish collaboration with
Nazis by indicating statements ensuring it is “stressed” that those who did not act like victims
were not true Poles. Words matter when developing a computer software to detect perceived
misuse of wording, labeling it a “memory error” in trying to change not just how contemporaries
understand accurate terminology but changing the very ways in which they remember
overarching narrative of the past, too.
The Polish impetus for historical truth as rendered through historical revisionism is
exceedingly apparent in the quest by a nongovernmental organization with strong governmental
ties, The Polish League Against Defamation, in their crusade against prominent historian Jan
PolishEmbassyDC, “Words Matter,” YouTube Video, 1:43, January 23, 2017,
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Grabowski upon the release of his book Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German
Occupied Poland. In countering the narrative purported by the IPN and its counterparts,
Grabowski became the target of institutionalized intimidation and intellectual assault.

II.

The Polish League Against Defamation and Its Crusade Against Jan Grabowski

A key thread throughout the revisions undertaken by Polish entities such as IPN or the Polish
League Against Defamation involves keeping the Second World War a historical event of
Polish—and not Jewish—suffering. It is for this reason that scholarship on the suffering of Jews
at the hands of Poles is threatening to the Polish ethno-nationalism described by Joanna Beata
Michlic in chapter two, of which “anti-Jewish idioms in Polish cultural and political life [can] be
seen as one of the chief markers.”146 This nationalism relies on increasingly revisionist histories
of Poland under occupation in World War II in order to place Poles in the brightest light
possible. It is to an example of revising and righting history by embarking on serious, deeprooted efforts to delegitimize academic scholarship that this chapter now turns.
On June 7, 2017, the Polish League Against Defamation released a statement signed by 134
scholars declaring that Polish-Canadian historian Jan Grabowski’s book Hunt for the Jews:
Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland was, to echo their tone, garbage. The book
uses immaculately researched archival material from German, Polish, and Jewish archives,
interviews with witnesses and survivors, and prominent secondary sources to reconstruct German
police searches for Jews with the help of Poles in wartime.147 The scholars urged Jan Grabowski
to “stop slandering the Polish nation and adopt an attitude befitting a researcher, which is to

Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2006): 3.
147 Archival sources include multiple IPN branches, Polish district courts, city and state archives in Poland, Ukraine,
and Germany, as well as published and unpublished Holocaust testimonies and diaries. Secondary sources include a
variety of articles and books in Polish, German, English, and French by notable scholars such as Barbara Engelking,
Jan Gross, and Andrzej Żbikowski.
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serve the truth.”148 In using language such as “Polish nation,” it becomes clear that the document
is part of an effort to preserve a specifically positive understanding of Poland and its nationalism
on an international stage in a rebuke to the American narratives surrounding the Holocaust and
Poland. Further, the statement “strongly opposed” the “false and wrong image of Poland and
Polish people” it claimed Grabowski put forth by “placing the blame for the Holocaust upon the
Polish nation.”149 Of the 134 scholars who signed the statement, none were professional
historians.150 When the Polish League Against Defamation released the statement of scholars, it
also published its own statement as an organization claiming that Grabowski “falsifies the
history of Poland, proclaiming the thesis that Poles are complicit in the extermination of Jews.”
They liken his “opinions,” as the report notably states, to those of Jan T. Gross, the author of the
highly controversial Neighbors, and Barbara Engelking, another prominent and controversial
Holocaust scholar in Poland. The statement goes on to classify Grabowski’s work as full of
“pseudofacts.”151 If the Institute of National Remembrance and its Truth About Camps campaign
signified Poland on the defensive, then the Polish League Against Defamation came out
swinging on the offensive. It is worth examining the specific words used in their statements—
after all, within the Orwellian world of IPN, words matter. In using words like “opinions” or
“pseudofacts,” the Polish League Against Defamation is discounting any work that goes against
the ways they believe Polish history should be written and remembered. In waging offensive and
defensive historically revisionist campaigns, Poland’s institutions illuminate the high stakes of
what it means to write and right history as it will be remembered around the world.
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In 2012, the Polish League Against Defamation—in Polish, Reduta Dobrego Imienia, or the
Good Name Redoubt—was founded by Maciej Świrski, the Deputy President of the Supervisory
Board of the Polish Press Agency, Deputy President of the Polish National Foundation (working
to promote Poland’s reputation abroad), and most significantly: the key player in passing the
“Holocaust bill,” or the January 2018 amendment to the Act on the Institute of National
Remembrance declaring punishment by prosecution, fine, and imprisonment to any entity who
used the phrase “Polish death camps” in an effort to rid the phrase from the international stage
once and for all.152 Upon the League collecting 41,000 signatures in support of the amendment, it
was reported that Świrski was the only person formally consulted by the Polish justice ministry
regarding the law before it was presented to parliament.153 In fact, when the law went public and
was met with international outrage, Świrski’s Polish National Foundation, in conjunction with
the Prime Minister’s office, undertook a multifaceted, English language social media campaign
in support of the law. In order to fully comprehend the League’s crusade against Jan Grabowski
and the subsequent response of Holocaust historians across the world, we must first examine the
activities and reach of the League’s founder Maciej Świrski and his influence on the League.
Had you been scrolling through Breitbart, an alt-right “news” source in the United States, on
February 7, 2018, you may have come across an ad compelling you to “Watch the movie:
Testimony of Truth #GERMANDEATHCAMPS.”154 Perhaps you were on Twitter and came across
the account originating in January 2018 called “United Against Defamation” with an image
reading: “Auschwitz-Birkenau is not a Polish name, and Arbeit Macht Frei is not a Polish
In addition to the 2018 “Truth About Camps” campaign, the Polish Embassy in the United States has led a
“Against ‘Polish Camps’ Campaign” in some capacity since 2004, asking people who see the phrase used to email it
in to the Embassy. Source: Against Polish Death/Concentration Camps: A How-To Guide, Embassy of the Polish
Republic in Washington, D.C., last updated July 4, 2016.
https://waszyngton.msz.gov.pl/en/news/against_polish_camps/
153 “The draft act on IPN was consulted with only one person – currently the deputy head of the Polish national
foundation.” Polsat News, February 7, 2018.
154 @zakavkaza. “That the Polish government is paying for this advertisement on Breitbart is wild.” Twitter, 7 Feb.
2018, 5:27p.m., https://twitter.com/zakavkaza/status/961381050269229067.
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phrase” to welcome you to its page. A nongovernmental organization based in the Netherlands,
United Against Defamation claims to “protect the truth about the Holocaust” and says you can
find them located in Warsaw, Tel Aviv, and New York City.155 Or maybe you were one of the
12.6 million people who viewed the video titled, “Today, we are still on the side of truth,”
published on the Prime Minister of Poland’s YouTube channel and propagating the line, “There
is no room for hatred or the distortion of history. #GERMANDEATHCAMPS”156 This video
features the music and animation from the Institute of National Remembrance film, The
Unconquered, which explains Polish history from World War II onward. The film talks of
Poland being betrayed in spite of all Poles went through during the war. The animated screen
pans to the United States of America and says, “We are the first to alert the world about the
Holocaust but politics appear to be more important than human life and nobody listens to us.”157
This is all to say: Śwriski’s influence extends beyond the Polish League Against Defamation
which he founded and into the social media consumptions of people all over the world.
In pushing a hashtag, #GERMANDEATHCAMPS, across multiple platforms, attention is drawn
to a select set of words. In fact, in addition to the IPN’s “Truth About Camps” campaign, Polish
National Radio hosts the website: http://germandeathcamps.info. Providing photos, videos, and
texts about Polish history during the Holocaust, the website has a section dedicated to instances
of “distortion[s] of history” as well as a portal to report instances of journalists or organizations
misusing the phrase “Polish death camps.” These websites, in addition to the social media
campaign waged against the phrase Polish death camps, were released at the same time as the
Amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance which criminalized the use of
such a phrase. Combined, these make up an all-out assault on historical remembrance. They

“About us.” United Against Defamation. January 2018. https://www.uadefamation.org/about.
Kancelaria Premiera, “Today, we are still on the side of truth,” YouTube Video, 0:30, Feb. 8, 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrkQ20SjHoU.
157 Institute of National Remembrance, The Unconquered, film, directed by Michał Misiński, 15 Sept. 2017.
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draw attention in flashy ways to exactly three words, and compel attention away from the work
of organizations like the Polish League Against Defamation in targeting scholars whose work
presents Poles or Poland in what they consider to be a negative, even defamatory light—claiming
that Jan Grabowski, for example, “falsifies the history of Poland, proclaiming the thesis that
Poles are complicit in the extermination of Jews.”158 Putting the (easily digestible via social
media) issue of Polish versus German death camps at the forefront of the international stage
moves the issue of historical revisionism—of which Poland works to do a lot of, making
dangerous and false claims such as Poles not having ever been complicit in the killing of Jews—
to the background. It is to this issue we now return.
When the Polish League Against Defamation and 134 scholars came out against Jan
Grabowski, they did so with a tone indicating anger. The League classifies Grabowski’s book,
Hunt for the Jews, receiving the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize as “disturbing.”159 It
is important to note that they use “disturbing” to refer to the way a Polish author could present
Poles in such a negative light whereas we might use “disturbing” to classify the shocking and
heart-wrenching contents of the book. Further, a League statement of defense published
approximately three weeks after the letter of Polish scholars makes a flippant claim about
Grabowski: “But here he is, using his authority as a scholar in such newspapers [as, among
others listed, The Washington Post] to support rhetoric which is not only unfavourable to Poland,
but also, if not primarily, deeply prejudiced and unfair.”160 The attack on Grabowski and his
scholarship did not go unnoticed. The Polish Center for Holocaust Research, of which
Grabowski is a part, published a statement calling the attack on him “as brutal as it is absurd,”

“PLAD [Polish League Against Defamation] publishes a statement concerning the activities of Jan Grabowski.”
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saying that they would be pleased to engage in scholarly debate with historians but none of the
letter’s signatories were members of the discipline.161 In addition to this scathing letter,
Grabowksi’s home institution, the University of Ottawa, sent a letter to the Polish League
Against Defamation insisting they stop harassing Grabowski and his credible scholarship.
Calling their statements “a vicious campaign directed at both [Grabowski’s] scholarship and at
him personally,” the letter was supplemented by a statement from the Dean of the Faculty of
History, Professor Sylvie Perrier, who characterized the League’s campaign as “slanderous” and
wrote that they had expressed their position clearly and “any further communications from your
organization are unnecessary.”162 Both the Polish Center for Holocaust Research and the
University of Ottawa responded forcefully to the offensive nature of the League’s accusations
and succeeded in shutting down their crusade against Jan Grabowski.
The letter from scholars distributed by the Polish League Against Defamation features
misleading statements guised as facts and arguments that are in line with the propaganda of the
“Truth About Camps” website but not in line with historical reality.163 Instead of taking specific
pieces of evidence from Grabowski’s book and explaining why the scholars do not find them
accurate, they deflect and pivot to an argument that “it is worth recalling that 6,706 Poles were
awarded the honour of the Righteous Among the Nations.” This invokes the language of the
“Truth About Camps” campaign in which certain aspects of history should be “stressed” while
others should be conveniently cast aside. Yet the scholars’ argument is undermined by their
mischaracterization of the significance of the number of Poles who received the honor of the
Righteous Among the Nations. Classified as a “remarkable” feat, the scholars say that

“In defence of Jan Grabowksi’s good name.” Polish Center for Holocaust Research. June 10, 2017.
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163 As an example, their letter states that “A 10 December 1942 note of the Ambassador of Poland Edward
Raczyński addressed to the Governments of the United Nations,” but the United Nations as it is invoked did not
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“communication barrier[s]” existed because “the possibility of providing Jews with effective
help was limited, as 85% of the pre-War Jewish population did not speak Polish.”164 In fact, the
majority of Polish Jews indeed must have spoken Polish, as noted by a U.S. intelligence report
detailing that 75% of the pre-war Polish Jewish population lived in cities and towns where they
learned, worked, and socialized (using their Polish language skills) among Polish speaking
Poles.165 In addition to showing the lengths to which some Poles will go to revise their history—
presenting inaccurate information—these components of the statement demonstrate the
undertaking to “other” Jews and separate their suffering from the suffering experienced by “true”
Poles in wartime. Poles who received the honor of Righteous Among the Nations are
consistently “stressed” because it is a chance to highlight the actions of some Poles who went, by
the logic of the Polish project, far above and beyond in a time of deep suffering and danger.166 In
attempting to delegitimize the work of Jan Grabowski, Poland is revising and righting history in
a way that poses direct harm to the histories taken out of the equation. There is a focus on
individual vice as unique and individual virtue as indicative of a whole nation. The efforts to put
Polish suffering on the international stage are, as the next section will show, a direct response to
the American narratives centered on Jewish suffering including at the hands of Poles.

III.

In Their Own Words: IPN’s Accounts of Polish History

In 2017, the IPN released an animated film called The Unconquered in Polish, English, and
Russian. Professional animation, powerful music, and attention to alleged historical detail all
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prevail in the film which the IPN says took two years to conceive of and produce.167 Narrated in
English by Sean Bean from Lord of the Rings and Game of Thrones, the film shows 24 key
moments in “Poland’s battle for freedom” in an attempt to “tell the story of Poland’s history—a
history that is complicated and yet unknown—in an exciting way.”168 It is telling what made it
into and what was left out of the story of Poland’s history. The film is decidedly militaristic. It
focuses on Polish suffering: showing stories of Poles forced into cattle cars and shipped off to
Soviet gulags, as well as narratives of the Polish army fighting alongside the Allied forces during
World War II. Poles put up resistance movements within German concentration camps, the film
notes, and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, when Polish Jews rose up against the Nazi forces in
April and May 1943, is mentioned. These moments lead into the film’s final takeaway message:
“Because we do not beg for freedom, we fight for it,” a quote from Polish General Witold
Urbanowicz.169 This is problematic because not all Polish citizens – namely Jews – were in any
sort of position to be able to fight for their freedom whether because they were in hiding, trying
to escape, or already in danger of persecution.
The Unconquered contains cameos from deliberately selected historical figures which the
movie’s description classifies as heroes such as Irena Sendler.170 Sendler, a Polish social worker,
worked with the Polish underground resistance movement as part of the Council for Aid to Jews.
She forged documents and smuggled over 2,500 Jewish children to safety out of the Warsaw
Ghetto. “There are Poles who save Jews despite the threat of the death penalty,” the film’s
narrator states. This is unequivocally true, yet it manipulates the viewer into seeing Poles only as
heroes or victims which is only one piece of the historical picture. Together, the narratives within
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with itself as hero.” The Washington Post, February 27, 2018.
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the film show a Polish history of people fighting consistently against their oppressors to no avail
and a virtuous group of people risking their lives to save those seemingly less fortunate, the
Polish Jews. Yet these narratives leave out points that nuance the stories. The film alludes to
Polish resistance fighter Jan Karski—recall he was honored posthumously by President Obama
with the Presidential Medal of Freedom—when saying, “We are the first to alert the world about
the Holocaust though politics appear to be more important than human lives and nobody listens
to us.” Jan Karski was indeed the first person “to deliver to western powers eyewitness accounts
of Nazi atrocities in the Warsaw ghetto and deportations of Jews to killing centers.”171 There is
no mention, however, of the fact that, as historian Peter Fritzsche pointed out in his book An Iron
Wind: Europe Under Hitler, Karski “hardly disguised his contempt for ‘the Polish peasant,
laborer, and half-educated, stupid, demoralized wretch” who welcomed the fact that the Germans
were ‘finally’ teaching the Jews ‘a lesson.’”172 The IPN Unconquered film tells a specific
history, a one-sided history, a history that is, as we will continue to see, even a manipulative one.
There is no mention in the film of the Poles who aided the Nazis, as Jan Grabowski’s
scholarship asserts, or of the Poles who massacred their Jewish neighbors without any prompting
by Nazis, as Jan Gross’s scholarship argues. One of the closing lines of the film, as the timeline
nears 1989, goes, “In exchange for all that we do [during World War II], we are betrayed. The
free world distances itself from us, leaving us behind the Iron Curtain.”173 With lines like these,
the IPN teaches that the world has something to apologize for, to make up for, to right, to prove
to Poland in contemporary times following what Poland deems to be extraordinary wrongs and
betrayal. This message is consistent whether in the “Truth About Camps” campaign, the film The
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Unconquered, or more blatantly on the official website of the Institute of National
Remembrance.
A page on the IPN website titled “Brief History of Poland 1939-1989” asserts, “It must be
remembered that Poland was the first country to stand against Hitler’s and Stalin’s invasion
plans.”174 This leaves out the fact that though Poland indeed never set up a collaborationist
government with the Nazis, plenty of Poles collaborated with the Nazis or directly benefitted
from Nazi treatment of Polish Jews.175 Jan Gross describes in his controversial book Golden
Harvest: Events at the Periphery of the Holocaust, the “diggers” who “sifted through the ashes
and remains of murdered Jews at sites of all the Nazi extermination camps in Poland (Treblinka,
Bełżec, Sobibór, Chełmno, and Auschwitz) for many years after the war, looking for pieces of
jewelry and dental gold overlooked by the Nazis.”176 History as it is written by Polish institutions
is about claiming memory and building national identity. Statements such as “it must be
remembered” or the earlier “it should be stressed” illuminate that Poland’s focus might claim to
be on accuracy—saying “German death camps in occupied Poland” as opposed to “Polish death
camps”—but in reality, the focus is on claiming and purporting a specific, doctored type of
memory and history.
What has happened as a result of the extreme nature of historical revisionism undertaken by
Poland is that extreme cries of Polish complicity in the Holocaust rang out from some American
Jews. In February 2018, in response to the Polish campaign against “Polish death camps,” an
American Jewish philanthropic foundation, the Ruderman Family Foundation, published a video
on YouTube titled, “I will go to jail.” The video featured Jews of various ages—a mother sitting
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with her two children, an elderly man, and young men and women—saying with force the phrase
“Polish Holocaust.” The video features lines such as, “So listen Polish people: What happened
during the Holocaust was enough. Repeal this disgraceful law now!” and “Jews will never again
be silenced. The USA should suspend all ties with Poland. Before it is too late.”177 The video
culminated with a plea to sign a petition stating that the United States should suspend all ties
with Poland. Jewish communities in Poland and the United States met the video with outrage.
The Jewish Community of Warsaw published a statement calling the video “false and hurtful,”
and pointed out that they did not agree with the actions of the Institute of National Remembrance
but “the answer…cannot be a hate campaign.”178 The American Jewish Committee, in a “rare
attack on a fellow American Jewish organization,” harshly condemned the video.179 The
Ruderman Family Foundation, responsible for the video, primarily focuses their philanthropic
efforts on advocacy for disability inclusion and Israel-American Jewish Relations. The Polish
Holocaust video can be considered out of character of the efforts typically undertaken by the
organization. It is noteworthy that the foundation’s video focuses on language and specific words
in using “Polish Holocaust” repeatedly both for shock value and to draw attention to the pairing
of the words—just as Polish campaigns sought to draw attention to the phrase “Polish death
camps,” though in the pursuit of an opposite goal.
This is all to say: the Orwellian Ministry of Memory within Poland is succeeding. Attention
to language abounds all around the world and especially within Poland. Poland’s Institute of
National Remembrance has shaped a nation to claim and hold dear a revised historical
understanding and memory that prioritizes Polish suffering and pushes Jewish suffering to the
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side while maintaining the groups’ separateness. Even the most extreme outrage from groups
within the American Jewish community, such as the “I’ll go to jail” video, caused uproar within
the global Jewish community—notably, in response to Jews saying “Polish Holocaust” as
opposed to Poles using their “Polish death camps” campaign to overshadow the more dangerous
historical revisionism taking place. Poland has masterfully distracted and deflected unflattering
histories in pursuit of an ethno-nationalist project that defines Jews as “other,” rewrites history,
and commandeers scholarship to support the work of the post-communist state on a global stage.
The prescience of historian Tony Judt’s 2005 argument, that Poland is indeed going to great
lengths to remember World War II—“It’s just that Jews were not part of the story”—is all too
clear.180
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CHAPTER FOUR
Identity, Victimhood, and Gray Zones:
The Controversial Publications of Jan Błónski and Jan Gross
With each and every tour I guided through the core exhibition at the Galicia Jewish
Museum in Kraków, I began with the same photo and the same question: who here has heard of
Oświęcim? Rarely did a visitor raise their hand. I followed up immediately: who here has heard
of Auschwitz? I do not recall any visitor ever not raising their hand. Auschwitz, a well-known
killing center of the Holocaust, is located in the town of Oświęcim, a nearly majority-Jewish
town in Poland before the Second World War. The town’s old synagogue still exists; it is now a
museum dedicated to the thriving prewar Jewish community of Oświęcim. Yet they receive
nowhere near the number of visitors that the Auschwitz Birkenau State Memorial Museum
receives. Visitors to Poland are well acquainted with Jewish death. This should not come as a
surprise given previous evidence: tourism at Auschwitz and the stories of Schindler’s List
reached millions upon millions of people. The thriving Jewish life from the eleventh century
onward in Poland, however, does not typically so much as ring a bell for visitors. I opened with
these questions—reflecting back to visitors the types of history and places they could recall in
Poland—so I could set up a tension from the beginning of the tour: when it comes to thinking
about history, there is more than one side. History is nuanced; it exists in, as this chapter will
explore, gray zones. When we think of Jewish history in Poland, we must think both about
Jewish life and death and about both Poles as victims and as perpetrators. This thesis has so far
demonstrated the ways in which Poland works to rid the public of any notion of nuance and
instead claim that Poles were entirely victims during the Second World War or that the only
history worth remembering is that of the Poles who risked their lives to save Jews.
Primo Levi, an Italian chemist and writer who survived the Holocaust, coined the term
“gray zone” in his 1986 essay collection The Drowned and the Saved. Arguing that it is human
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nature to want to draw dividing lines between victims and perpetrators, Levi says this is
inaccurate in the face of the reality of the lived experiences of Jews in Nazi concentration camps,
particularly because it was part of Nazi practice to blur the line between victim and accomplice
to the crime. He writes most notably of what he deems “privileged prisoners”—belonging to
groups such as the sonderkommandos, the work units comprised of Jewish prisoners threatened
with death and forced to aid Nazis in clearing victims from gas chambers—and forces his readers
to confront the notion that a prisoner could be both privileged and in despair at the same time.
Levi asks his readers to suspend both their disbelief and their judgment in pursuit of a complex,
nuanced understanding of what it meant to be a prisoner in a place such as Auschwitz. History,
wartime history in particular, exists in gray zones—worlds in which actors can be both victims
and perpetrators, or in which someone can be both Polish and Jewish without a hyphenated
identity—and it is these gray zones which we should allow to influence our interpretation of
history. This argument can be made by demonstrating what has happened when gray zones are
contested or take a backseat to one-sided, revisionist views. This chapter explores a theoretical
framework for approaching the notions of “memory” and “remembering” that allow us to enter
into a complex understanding of the work of, and subsequent pushback against, Polish historian
and literary critic Jan Błónski in the 1980s and Polish-American historian Jan Gross in the early
2000s.

I.

Memory vs. Remembering

In addition to asking museum visitors about Oświęcim and Auschwitz on each tour, I also
spent substantial time discussing contemporary issues regarding how the Holocaust is
remembered in Poland. We talked of the different ways in which old synagogues are used by
communities today when there are no Jews left to make use of them: some have been turned into
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bars, such as an Old West style saloon in Chełm, and others such as the old synagogue in the
village of Niebylec into public libraries.181 We also talked of what became of the former slavelabor camp Pustków which was destroyed by Nazis in 1944 and rebuilt in 2012 by Poles eager to
reconstruct the camp as it once stood in order to use it for educational purposes. Polish radio
began reporting in 2007 that authorities from the Dębica region of southern Poland had obtained
European Union funding to build a replica of the Nazi slave-labor camp, complete with details
such as barbed wire, barracks, and a main entrance gate. Polish Jews did not support the plan.
Piotr Kadlcik, chairman of the Union of Religious Jewish Communities in Poland, said on record
that he found the reconstruction “weird” and was deeply skeptical of what the project’s message
would be. “It’s like building an attraction, like a scare house,” he said, “the kind at a carnival
where people pay to get scared out of their minds. This is not a good idea.”182 Controversy
ensued as some took offense to the reconstruction of a concentration camp—the Galicia Jewish
Museum coined it the “Disneyland Reconstruction” in the exhibit caption accompanying the
photo of the reconstructed camp183—and others found significance in helping people to see and
feel what history might have looked like.
As I sifted through information about Pustków, I realized that perhaps the most important
aspect of this camp is not how it is or isn’t remembered—it is what a survivor’s testimony tells
us about the divisions between Jews and Poles within the camp. A memorial plaque indicates
that 7500 Jews and 2500 Poles perished in Pustków.184 A rendering of the camp by Mordechai
Lustig, a Polish-Jewish survivor of multiple camps who lived in Israel until his death, depicts a
Jewish camp area and a Polish camp area as having separate facilities and entrances. Lustig
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explained to translator William Leibner, “Most of the inmates from the Jewish concentration
camp were Polish Jews, but they had little contact with the Polish concentration camp inmates.
Both camps were guarded by Ukrainian S.S. who hated the Jews and the Poles with the same
passion.”185 The way Pustków is remembered by contemporaries does not differentiate between
Jews and Poles, yet lived experiences that reside in the memory of those individuals were
imprisoned in the camp do. There is work to be done in teasing out how groups of people
actively remember their history and what that means for historical gray zones.
The scholarship this chapter is based upon—notably Joanna Michnic-Coren’s 1999 article
“The Troubling Past: The Polish Collective Memory of the Holocaust,” Neighbors by Jan T.
Gross in 2001, and selections from Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic’s 2003 The
Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland—all depend on
ideas of collective memory. Harold Marcuse, historian of Germany, presides over a document
tracing the definitions of collective memory as they have evolved. He splits the definitions into
pre-1990s, 1990s, and 2000s. Most broadly defined, collective memory is the shared
understanding through historical sources ranging from testimonies to family narratives, from
movies to books, of the memories that compose a particular group’s identity.186 I prefer a
different term and structure my analysis of sources around a more active, individually-centered
term: collective remembrance. To ask how individuals or groups are remembering and putting
the memories into their shared lived experiences—for instance, who decides that a monument or
memorial should be built, and to commemorate whom, and what is the process of determining
what the inscription says, and who pays for the building and maintenance?—is, to me, a more
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pressing issue. Even in a world in which individual memories of events have often faded due to
the aging and death of the wartime generation, considering how their descendants, students, and
others remember what they have learned and consumed still matters. Jay Winter, a Yale historian
of World War I, makes a compelling case favoring the term “collective remembrance” as
opposed to the term “collective memory.” He says that collective memory has been overused to
the point of losing its meaning entirely, whereas collective remembrance “points to time and
place above all, to evidence, to traces enabling us to understand what groups of people try to do
when they act in public to conjure up the past.”187 He explains that privileging the act of
remembering privileges specific agency: “on answering the question who remembers, when,
where, and how?”188 We have so far seen exactly what groups of people in Poland have done in
acting to conjure up the past: writing historically revisionist narratives that right wrongs in order
to suggest a specific past, one which separates the stories of suffering between Jews and Poles
and ensures the Polish past is received by the world in the most flattering light.

II.

Narrative of Denial: Identity and Victimhood in Poland Pre-2001

Joanna Michnic-Coren argued in 1999 that “the dominant pattern of perception of the
Holocaust [in Poland] has been characterized by historical inaccuracies, distortions, and
omissions.” She used two dominant patterns to support her argument: a deliberate unwillingness
to acknowledge the differences in suffering and fate of ethnic Poles and Polish Jews at the hands
of Nazi occupation and a push to deny any “wrongdoing that might reflect negatively on the
ethnic Polish community as the key witness to the Holocaust.”189 We have seen these patterns
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play out time and time again. The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and its “Truth About
Camps” campaign as well as other revisionist historical outputs such as the film The
Unconquered are examples of historical distortion, omission, and inaccuracies on behalf of Poles
sharing their history with the world. The crusade against Jan Grabowski’s book Hunt for the
Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland illuminated the unwillingness to
acknowledge wrongdoing at the hands of Poles in ways that shed negative light on the Polish
community. Michnic-Coren utilizes what she deems the “narrative of denial” to explore the
implications of an identity—what it means to be truly Polish—shaped by a call to win the
“victimization competition” in which Poles insist that they suffered more than Jews in the
Second World War. To build an identity around a claim to victimhood is a dangerous route to
travel: it led to Polish efforts to write history in ways that right wrongs or revise unflattering
moments. Doing so while holding claim to a status of victimhood, particularly in claiming to
have suffered the most or in especially unfair ways, is where problems arise.
The problem specific to Poland, Michnic-Coren argues, is that coming to terms with the
troubling past— negative perceptions surrounding Jews that result in their “othering” in pursuit
of a “future independent Polish nation-state along ethno-national lines” where Jews are not
considered a part of the project190—never completely happened because it would have destroyed
an image of a heroic, suffering Poland.191 Michnic-Coren published in 1999 before the
establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance or the Polish League Against
Defamation and before the publications of Jan T. Gross’s Neighbors and Jan Grabowski’s Hunt
for the Jews. Yet Poland has been entrenched in purporting a “narrative of denial” since the
1980s: a narrative full of myths that Poles acted entirely in “principled” ways toward Jews in the
Holocaust and a narrative claiming anti-Polonism when morally challenging problems or
190
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interrogations arise. This narrative, Michnic-Coren reasons, “may also provide a fuller
explanation of why information on the genocide of Polish Jewry does not form part of Polish
social history.”192 Recall that one of the essential (as well as most controversial) questions of Jan
T. Gross’s 2001 Neighbors, the story of a Polish village that massacred their Jewish neighbors,
was this: “How can the wiping out of one-third of its urban population be anything other than a
central issue of Poland’s modern history?”193 That Michnic-Coren’s argument appears so
prescient regarding the more contemporary issues within this thesis illuminates the ways in
which Poland’s quest to revise history is not new. While the texts and sources in question have
changed, the nationalist mission has changed only in that it has become intensified. A critical
source that Michnic-Coren relies on in her argument is the controversial article by Polish
historian and literary critic Jan Błónski entitled “The Poor Pole Looks at the Ghetto.”
When Jan Błónski published his article in the progressive Catholic intelligentsia paper
Tygognik Powszechny in 1987,194 the response from readers was unlike anything the paper had
ever seen according to editor Jerzy Turowicz:
When we printed the article, I was, as were my colleagues, aware that it would be an event to
which there would certainly be a strong reaction. Their reaction was greater than anything
known in the course of the 42 years during which I have edited that paper. I cannot remember
any article which provoked such a strong reaction on the part of my readers.195
What shocked and provoked Polish readers? Błónski pushed back against the narrative of denial
that encapsulated and shaped Polish interpretations of the Holocaust. He directly addressed the
misconceptions and distortions that shaped Polish historiography, saying “We read or listen to
discussions on the subject of the Polish-Jewish past and if some event, some fact which puts us
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in a less-than-advantageous light, emerges, we try our hardest to minimize it, to explain it away
and make it seem insignificant.” In calling this out to an audience of Poles—even progressive
ones—he struck at the very heart of an emotional issue. He hypothesizes that the reason for the
defensiveness is because:
…whether consciously or unconsciously, we fear accusations…We want to be absolutely
beyond any accusation, we want to be completely clean. We want to be also—and only—
victims. This concern is, however, underpinned by fear—just as Milosz’s poem—and this
fear warps and disfigures our thoughts about the past.196
The poem he refers to is a 1943 poem by Czesław Miłosz, “A Poor Christian Look at the
Ghetto.” The poem paints a portrait of destruction, of a ghetto and a city in ruins, and what
remains in a “guardian mole.” The mole moves through the ground—through the ashes, the
bodies, the destruction—and the speaker of the poem is afraid of the mole. The mole is
anthropomorphized to possess “the features of a Jew, poring over the Talmud or the Bible” and
the message is this: “The mole burrows underground but also underneath our consciousness. This
is the feeling of guilt which we do not want to admit…The fear of a non-Jew who looks at the
ghetto burning down…The Christian feels fearful of the fate of the Jew but also—muffled,
hidden even from himself—he feels the fear that he will be condemned.”197 Błónski puts into
public words the very private, even subconscious, feelings and perceptions of Poles who
witnessed the events of the Holocaust. Michael Steinlauf argued in Bondage to the Dead,
published around ten years after Błónski’s article, that Poles were unlike any other witnesses to
the Holocaust because it is one thing to witness, for instance, a ghetto on fire in your
neighborhood and it is an entirely other thing to fully comprehend the widespread, systemized
nature of the killings. Poles did not grasp that during the war.198
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Where Błónski created severe tension was with his call to action. “We must say first of
all—Yes, we are guilty,” he wrote.199 He acknowledged that readers would likely protest any sort
of shared responsibility for the genocide of Polish Jews, and he did not necessarily disagree. “So
why talk of genocide? And of shared responsibility? My answer is this: participation and shared
responsibility are not the same thing. One can share the responsibility for the crime without
taking part in it.”200 Błónski is illuminating the same kind of tension I brought to bear on my
tours of the Galicia Jewish Museum, the same tension Primo Levi fleshed out in The Drowned
and the Saved: history exists in gray zones, in nuance, in complexity. In the case of Błónski’s
assessment of Polish interpretation and active remembrance of the Holocaust, it is important to
discuss both participation and shared responsibility. Błónski’s call to remember precisely the
events that the broader Polish national project works to help its citizens forget, move past, brush
off, or alter was quite radical both in its time and into today. In moving past the competitive
victimhood and saying that both groups suffered—and suffered differently and in incomparable
ways—Błónski challenged the Polish national project in calling for a sympathy with Polish Jews
that had yet to be seen in Polish scholarship and widespread writings even into the present
moment.

III.

Narrative of Denial: Identity and Victimhood in Poland, 2001 – present

When historian Jan Gross wrote an article in 1998 on the ways in which Christian Poles
mistreated their Jewish neighbors, he used the 1945 testimony of Szmuel Wasersztajn.
Wasersztajn experienced (through hiding and surviving) an anti-Jewish pogrom in Jedwabne, a
village in the Białystok region of Poland, in 1941, and had staggering accounts to show for it.
The pogrom took place on July 10, 1941, less than a month after Germans entered the village. “I
199
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saw with my own eyes how those murderers killed Chajcia Wasersztajn, Jakub Kac, seventythree years old, and Eliasz Krawiecki,” he began. “Jakub Kac they stoned to death with bricks.
Krawiecki they knifed and then plucked his eyes and cut off his tongue. He suffered terribly for
twelve hours before he gave up his soul.”201 He went on to describe how a Polish priest
intervened, telling the citizens to halt their pogrom with the reasoning that the Germans would
handle it. While this stopped the pogrom, Wasersztajn explained,
From this day on the local population no longer sold foodstuffs to Jews, which made their
circumstances all the more difficult. In the meantime rumors spread that the Germans would
issue an order that all the Jews be destroyed…Even though the Germans gave the order, it
was Polish hooligans who took it up and carried it out, using the most horrible methods…It is
impossible to represent all the brutalities of the hooligans, and it is difficult to find in our
history of suffering something similar. Beards of old Jews were burned, newborn babies were
killed at their mothers’ breasts, people were beaten murderously and forced to sing and
dance. In the end they proceeded to the main action—the burning.202
The testimony continues on in describing the ways in which the Poles rounded up each and every
last Jew, from elderly man to sick child, and “after various tortures and humiliations, they burned
all the Jews in a barn.”203
Gross utilized this brutal testimony in his scholarship but quickly realized he had made a
mistake in his interpretation. He later wrote,
I did not fully register then [in 1998] that after the series of killings and cruelties
described by Wasersztajn, at the end of the day all remaining Jews were actually burned
(I must have read this as a hyperbolic trope, concluding that only some had been killed
that way.) A few months after I submitted my essay…I realized that Wasersztajn has to
be taken literally.”204
This raw writing indicates the shock of Jan Gross in unearthing the Jedwabne massacre and
foreshadows the shock that would engross all of Poland when his book examining the subject
was later published. The account Gross shared from Szmuel Wasersztajn directly contradicts
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every aspect of the narrative of denial purported by Poland and sent the nation into a state of
shock, reckoning—and still, denial. Gross’s argument within Neighbors, a book that is
meticulously researched, involves asking how and why the story of Jedwabne’s Jews—and the
murder of Polish Jews in World War II more broadly—is, in any way, shape, or form, denied or
swept aside. Jan Gross relied on Polish archives, some state-run and others run by Jewish
institutions, to produce court documents, investigation protocols, and clemency petitions by the
massacre perpetrators, for instance, and he placed heavy emphasis on using testimony from those
who survived or witnessed.205 There is dispute, particularly in Poland, over the sourcing Gross
relied on yet searches into specific moments of contestation proved that Gross’s finds and
interpretations of archival material were indeed correct.
For instance, a piece in Contemporary European History by John Connelly argued,
“Gross had insisted that the few Germans present in Jedwabne did little more than take pictures,
and to date, after months of research in Polish and German archives, nothing has emerged to
contest his vision.” And in fact, Connelly noted that even the IPN, the Polish Institute of
National Remembrance, agreed with Gross’s outcome on the topic of German complicity.206
Whether they agreed because of the documentation or because German complicity fits with the
political narratives they purport remains to be seen. When it came to testimony, Gross was
willing to take the words of people like Szmuel Wasersztajn as seriously as he would take the
word of a nearby Polish peasant. His reliance and trust in testimony is an aspect of sourcing that
later historians have criticized. Janine P. Holc, in her article “Working Through Jan Gross’s
‘Neighbors,’” noted, “Testimonials have been viewed as problematic tools for validating
historical facts, but Gross defends the role of survivor accounts in historical scholarship as not
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only an overlooked resource but our best avenue for capturing realities that dominant cultural
realities have kept hidden.”207 This is particularly important in the case of Polish historiography,
and underlies the question that Jan Gross asks, and that Joanna Michnic-Coren asked, too, how
can the destruction of nearly an entire population group, comprising a third of the country’s
urban population, not be a central, national historical issue in Poland?208 which was not well
received and resulted in a variety of loaded responses to his work. The issue of the destruction of
Jedwabne’s population is critical, though it is the entirety of the period’s trauma—the violence
and powerlessness Jews faced, and how the Poles contributed to that whether actively or
passively—which we must probe. It is the responses to Jan Gross’s work to which we now look.
Within two years of the publication of Neighbors in Poland and within one year of
publication in the United States, Polish scholars had much to say on the book and particularly
about the sourcing used to make claims about such a horrific massacre. Wojciech Roszkowski, a
politician, economist, former member of the European Parliament, and current affiliate of the
right-wing nationalist party, Law and Justice, wrote a provocative piece in 2002 titled “After
Neighbors: Seeking Universal Standards.” While it is not every day that a politician publishes an
article in an academic journal, Roszkowski worked also as a historian. Publishing under a pen
name, Andrzej Albert, his books about twentieth-century Polish history and political theory have
since been translated into English. His After Neighbors piece argued that “Neighbors is by no
means a scholarly work,” but rather one of multiple “political pamphlets with an a priori
thesis.”209 He goes into detail regarding which specific flawed testimonies Gross used and
disputes over the way in which Gross selected witnesses for his project. For all the detail his
argument provides, Roszkowski does not lose sight of the bigger picture, either, writing: “Polish-

Janine P. Holc, “Working Through Jan Gross’s ‘Neighbors.’” Slavic Review 61, no. 3 (2002): 45.
Gross, Neighbors, xix.
209 Wojciech Roszkowski, “After Neighbors: Seeking Universal Standards.” Slavic Review 61, no. 3 (2002): 462.
207
208

85

Jewish controversies, like the one involving Neighbors, paradoxically stem from both sides
adopting the assumption that they have been innocent victims of history…Moreover, extremists
from both sides tend to become furious if their misfortunes are compared.”210 We have seen the
way this plays out, the way that entering into historical understandings through high-powered
emotion leads to extremism, with the case of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance
attempting to curb any mention of “Polish death camp” within international media and the
subsequent response of the Ruderman Family Foundation’s video featuring the phrase “Polish
Holocaust” repeated over and over in a follow-up attack on the proposal.
Yet the most pressing point Roszkowski makes is one not about extremism but rather a
point that provides further insight into the relation between historical revisionism and the Polish
national project. Coming from a politician and historian, the following quote should come not as
a shock but perhaps as a reminder, a clue, a key to understanding identity, victimhood, and gray
zones on a national scale. His overall claim—“there are no innocent nations just as there are no
guilty nations”211—works well in proving his point that Poles as a nation do not need to profess
guilt for what happened to Polish Jews during World War II yet undermines other attempts to
write off any sort of Polish guilt or complicity in the Holocaust by blaming Germany or Germans
as a whole. Roszkowski explains,
As compared to other nations, Polish collaboration with the Nazis was absolutely
marginal. There was no rump Polish state in Poland, and there were generally no Polish
organizations tolerated by the Nazis. There were cases of spontaneous manifestations of
anti-Jewish feelings in such tragic events as those in Jedwabne…and there were cases
when the scum of Polish society sold Jews to Nazi henchmen, but it would be unfair to
blow these incidents out of proportion. It would also be unfair to forget that Poles
frequently, if often incorrectly, considered Polish Jews to be communists or
sympathizers.212
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It is significant that Roszkowski finds different ways to assert that Poland, on the whole, did not
collaborate with the Nazis on any scale similar to other nations, and worries of instances of
collaboration—which he acknowledges existed, though qualifies in saying they were “absolutely
marginal”—being blown out of proportion. One could alternatively think of this to mean that
collaboration took place at the hands of the scum of society, which every nation has and every
nation despises. Time and time again, we see that Poles, particularly those in positions of power
whether politically or intellectually, draw attention to an argument that Polish wartime
collaboration with the Nazis is not worth paying attention to or that it is “unfair” to be
remembered. The notion of fairness is a particularly fascinating one. When has history ever been
fair? Individual memories are not intrinsically fair, either, as we are likely to privilege our own
suffering in our memories. Is it not unfair to Polish Jews that their suffering at the hands of their
Polish neighbors is revised out of Poland’s national history? To bring questions of fairness to
bear is a marker of an emotional argument, and it is telling that Roszkowski’s argument extends
into such a realm. Such emotion hints at a nationalist agenda rather than an academic one.
Roszkowski continues on, writing,
As a fair nation, Poles should apologize for any Jewish life that was lost due to malicious
Polish action—not for any reason of collective guilt but because Poles should feel
responsible for the values (“Thou shall not kill”) transgressed against by those murderers
who were Poles. But this should be a moral reflection rather than a political event
spotlighted by the media that leaves the false impression that Poles feel guilty as a
nation.213
The dichotomy between Poles apologizing for Jewish life lost at the hands of Polish
collaboration with Nazis or unaffiliated Polish violence as being a moral question and explicitly
not a political question is noteworthy. When Roszkowski draws attention to ensuring that readers
do not take his call for a Polish apology to mean anything political, it begs the question: why the
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concern? Also important is the mention of the media being the entity that “leaves a false
impression that Poles feel guilty as a nation.”214 Roszkowski is referring here to the international
media attention upon the publication of Neighbors, to media attention—and likely cultural
attention—that presents the narrative antithesis to the Polish “narrative of denial” in painting
Poland as a nation with blood on its hands, a nation reeling in guilt, a vulnerable nation, a nation
susceptible to being defined by its weakest points in history. None of these reputations, of
course, are wanted by Poland as leaders pursue their nationalist project.
In calling for Polish reflection on the past to be interpreted morally and not politically,
Roszkowski asks for a highly individualized, challenging to argue with, unquantifiable approach
to collective remembrance. His ask and his argument ensure not only that Poles are not held
responsible for the damning evidence presented in Neighbors but also that they are the moral
victors, taking initiative to apologize on behalf of the values that all Poles should share—“Thou
shall not kill”—as opposed to atoning, attempting to make right, or simply acknowledging the
atrocious actions of the Poles of Jedwabne against their Jewish neighbors. This work is meant for
us, the outsider, to interpret Poles as the victim time and time again, as wrongfully “on the hook”
for the actions of those unrelated to them and taking the moral high road when, in fact, this takes
away attention from Polish-Jewish victims, writing and solidifying stories of separate suffering.

IV.

Responding to Neighbors: Identity and Victimhood Outside of Poland
In addition to the work by Janine P. Holc and Wojciech Roszkowski which we

encountered in the Slavic Review, there is other work to consider from a variety of Polish and
American writers. Scholars Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic compiled a large quantity of
sources relating to responses to Neighbors from Poland and around the world in their anthology
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The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy Over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland. Published in
2004, the anthology includes a vast array of sources translated from Polish ranging from the
initial reporting on news of the massacre brought to light by Jan Gross, to the moral debate that
played out across Polish cultural and intellectual publications, to official statements from Poles
and Americans, to debates within the Catholic Church, the residents of Jedwabne themselves, the
historians who study them, and, finally, the conversations surrounding the issue that took place
outside of Poland and primarily in the United States. We will first consider Joanna TokarskaBakir’s January 2001 article in the leading (and left-leaning) Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza titled
“Obsessed with Innocence.” She writes of the Polish obsession with innocence and the ways in
which it is damaging to those who suffer, weaving together a variety of sources we have
explored in this chapter thus far. She begins: “I cannot resist the thought that Gross would not
have written this book if he had not worked abroad.”215 Jan Tomasz Gross—she almost always
writes out his full name in what is likely meant to draw attention to his Polish identity in spelling
and naming—was born in Warsaw but pursued graduate schooling at Yale University and later
took a job within the Department of History at Princeton University where he remains as a
professor emeritus today. Notably, Tokarska-Bakir is not referring to any sort of thought
regarding logistics, censorship, or the sort of reasoning why Gross could not have written the
article in Poland. Rather it is because it is impossible to see what is right in front of you, she
argues, what you are deeply immersed and wrapped within but might not necessarily
comprehend.
The way Gross tackled his historical work and writing is what Tokarska-Bakir classifies
as a “new approach to the sources,” in which she is referring to a statement by Gross himself.
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“Our initial attitude toward every report by would-be victims of the Holocaust,” he asserts,
“should be changed from one of doubt to one of affirmation.”216 While this is a feel-good
approach that makes complete sense to morally minded people who do not want to create more
trauma for those already traumatized, Tokarska-Bakir points out a glaring issue that remains: “It
can only convince someone who is already convinced.”217 She writes of the people who are
persuaded by sources and texts such as the poetry of Czesław Miłosz “about the mole-guardian
with the red lamp on his forehead” and the writing of Jan Błónski in “The Poor Pole Looks at the
Ghetto” as well as other similar works as the people who do not exactly need to be reading it.218
That is to say, it is precisely the people who should be reading historical accounts such as
Neighbors who are the ones likely to take it less seriously. But Tokarska-Bakir’s chapter is of
course, as its title suggests, ultimately about the Polish obsession with innocence. As an
anthropologist, she writes of being much more interested in what people say about the facts as
opposed to what the facts say themselves. And when it comes to Neighbors, the root of the
discussion, the angst, the fury—all of the heavy emotions associated with the illumination of an
exceedingly dark moment in Polish history and Jewish suffering—is that it strikes at what Jan
Błónski deemed the heart of the issue: the fear of being named an accomplice to the crime in the
eyes of an unforgiving world. Tokarska-Bakir concludes her article with an emotional plea,
writing of the book Jak żyć [How to live] by Father Józef Tischner who wrote, “‘If Poles were
truly religious, they would not try so forcefully to convince themselves and others of their
innocence.’ Amen.”219 To strive for an image of innocence is to move beyond the gray zone, to
not allow oneself or one’s history to exist in any sort of gray area. To strive for innocence is to
straddle politics and morality, to insist, as Roszkowski does, that it is unfair to privilege stories
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of Polish collaboration over stories of Polish suffering. To strive for innocence is to convince, to
persuade, to put forth a nationalist project that prioritizes Polish innocence over Jewish suffering.

V.

Neighbors Across Country Lines: Officials Respond
The Polish conversation about Jedwabne extended beyond Poland and into the United

States via high-ranking Polish government officials. Polonsky and Michlic’s The Neighbors
Respond features a section compiled of official addresses delivered by Polish officials. Among
the most significant is an address delivered in Washington, D.C. at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum by then-Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Władysław Bartoszewski. He
explained in his speech that the purpose of his U.S. visit was “to [have] meetings with Mr.
Powell and Ms. Rice” and that he “made a special effort to have the opportunity for at least a
short meeting at the Holocaust Memorial Museum.” The meeting came on April 5, 2001, shortly
before Jan Gross’ Neighbors would be released in the United States. Bartoszewski never
mentioned Jan Gross or Neighbors by name; he instead spoke around the topic, clearly trying to
get ahead of the issue. His opening lines present him as an ally: “Dear Friends,” he says, “I am
starting in this way because I see only friendly people in this hall. I think the unfriendly ones
have simply stayed home. The authors of the anonymous letters I receive often regard me as a
Jew. They think that that is a way to offend me, but it isn’t.”220 Following this strange opening of
a diplomatic speech, more pleasantries are offered, more examples of ways in which
Bartoszewski is a friend to all. And then comes discussion of Jedwabne. A book has recently
come out in Poland, he explains, published by a Catholic monthly, Więć, and titled Thou Shalt
Not Kill: Poles on Jedwabne. An anthology, it compiles various writings by Polish authors on
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Jedwabne, including, notably, Jan Błónski’s “The Poor Pole Looks at the Ghetto.” Bartoszewski
explained that after his speech, the Polish secretary-general of the Council for the Protection of
Monuments to Struggle and Martyrdom would address the crowd to speak about the
investigation launched into Jedwabne.221 Polish representatives are speaking to an audience
composed of, presumably, American Jews, and in doing so are stressing the importance of
Jedwabne to them, their institutions, and the world.
Recall the way in which Polish politician, writer, and historian Wojciech Roszkowski
combined a discussion of the need for Poles to issue a moral apology for atrocities committed
against Jews with a discussion of the way it was profoundly unfair to “blow out of proportion”
the topic of Polish collaboration with Nazis. The same tactic is used by Bartoszewski in his
Washington, D.C. address. He emphasizes how the audience will learn about the Polish work to
investigate Jedwabne, then shifts to the following point:
I should not like it to be forgotten that it was Poland that put on trial and justly executed
such criminals such as Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz; Greiser, the Gauleiter of
western Poland, whose territorial jurisdiction included the Lódź ghetto; Goeth, the
executioner of the Kraków ghetto; and Stroop, the executioner of the Warsaw ghetto.
Crimes did get prosecuted and a great many collaborators ended up in jail. But that
wasn’t sufficiently written up or publicized.222
To say he would not like it to be forgotten is akin to the Polish Institute of National
Remembrance saying “It must be remembered” or “It should be stressed” as we encountered in
the previous chapter. We must be wary of any person or entity attempting to redirect our
attention, tell us what we should think about, prioritize, or remember. In this case, in D.C. at the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, it is exchanging memory or questioning of
Jedwabne for heralding Polish efforts to pursue justice for war criminals. In making these swaps,
we are moving too far away from the notion of history as existing in gray zones and
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complexities. We are not making space for the world of, as Primo Levi might say, privileged
prisoners. We are not making space to talk both about Jewish life in Poland and about the fact
that King Kazimierz formally welcomed Jews fleeing persecution to the then-Kingdom of Poland
in the eleventh century and about the destruction and horror Jews saw in Poland in the twentieth
century. We are not making space for “The Poor Poles Looks at the Ghetto” and questions of
Polish innocence and for the criticism and arguments of people such as Wojciech Roszkowski.
If history does not, or cannot, exist in gray zones, then extremism comes to bear.
Nationalists cannot have history exist in gray zones because there must be clear winning and
losing nations and ways of living. It makes sense, then, that Poland has not—and still does not—
make room for these types of gray zones. Whether through revisionist history campaigns making
history into a black and white, right or wrong, set of stories or in responding to American
cultural markers such as Schindler’s List by making the conversation not about Jewish suffering
but about Polish suffering, Poland writes its history in dangerous ways.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Contemporary Fight Over the Not-So-Distant Past
On February 1, 2018, news outlets around the world broke the news that Poland’s Senate
officially passed what would come to be known as the infamous “Holocaust bill.” The law, an
amendment to the existing Act on the Institute of National Remembrance, made it a criminal
offense punishable by fine and up to three years of jail time for “…whoever accuses, publicly
and contrary to the facts, that the Polish nation or the Republic of Poland is responsible or coresponsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich…”223 In breaking the news, the BBC
explained, “President Andrzej Duda says Poland has the right ‘to defend historical truth.’”224
News of the bill—and analysis about the dangers it posed for historians of the Holocaust,
particularly those writing of instances of Polish complicity such as Jan Gross or Jan
Grabowski—held strong for months. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, “described
[the bill] as an attempt to rewrite history and deny the Holocaust.”225 With Poland claiming the
right to institute legislation to “defend historical truth” and Israel claiming that same legislation
would revise history in such a way as to deny the Holocaust, tensions between competing visions
and understandings of history illuminate how far apart two nations are positioned in recalling the
same moment of historical suffering. The New York Times editorial board classified the
legislation as “Poland’s Holocaust Blame Bill” in a scathing article, writing, “It is baffling why
Poland’s nationalist-controlled Parliament would mark International Holocaust Remembrance
Day…with a needless, foolish, and insulting [bill].”226 This bill maintained its spot in the news
and cemented itself into the minds of many. When I got to Poland nearly six months later and
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began work at a Holocaust and Jewish culture museum in June 2018, one group of people in
particular consistently asked about it: American Jewish tourists to Poland.
On my first day at the Galicia Jewish Museum in Kraków, I shadowed a tour. Larysa, a
Polish educator at the museum, guided a group of American Jewish visitors from Florida (on a
heritage tour in eastern Europe) through the museum’s main exhibition. Barely fifteen minutes
into the tour, an older woman interrupted Larysa’s explanation of Jewish life as it once stood in
Kraków to ask about the “Holocaust bill.” Larysa explained that the law was complicated. It had
not gone into effect yet; it stipulated protections for educational institutions that were not
reported internationally; and, most importantly, the museum staff would never let it impact their
work. The woman did not like this answer. She began shouting at Larysa. In an email I wrote
that night, I paraphrased the account as followed: She yelled about the fact this bill could even be
established is disgraceful, blamed Larysa for the acts of the Polish government, and threw her
hands up. A minute or so later she cried, “I just can’t listen to this woman anymore!” and
stormed out. We know that American Jews are nearly conditioned to expect the worst from
Poland and Poles. Popular cultural narratives like those found in Schindler’s List portray Poland
as a land of Jewish death and Poles as a people who hate Jews. This interaction between
American Jewish visitor and Polish host illuminates the ways in which, following the passage of
the Holocaust bill, the historically rooted tensions explored throughout this thesis came to a
boiling head.
This chapter outlines various contemporary fights over the not-so-distant past. It is all too
trite to say “history repeats itself”; this chapter is not that. What is not trite but simply true is that
patterns occur throughout history and operate in ways that connect distant pasts with modern
pasts, the past with the present, and, in all likelihood, the past and present with the future. It is
then fitting to bring to bear in what follows instances in which the actors, institutions,
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movements, and historical debates explored thus far in this thesis have interacted with each other
across recent time and space.
Before we dive into the Holocaust bill of early 2018 and all that followed, we must
realize that this bill did not appear out of nowhere. Scholar Mark Kramer has argued that the
“main impetus” for national debates on the topic of Polish complicity in the Holocaust stems in
large part from the publication of Neighbors by Jan Gross in 2000. We saw this in exploring the
historical moments before, during, and after the release of Neighbors. What Kramer adds is that
the criticism of Gross and his irrefutable claim that Polish Jews suffered at the hands of nonJewish Poles “escalated after the right-wing populist Law and Justice party [or Prawo I
Sprawiedliwość, PiS] of Jarosław Kaczyński won Poland’s parliamentary elections and Andrzej
Duda, a PiS leader, won the presidency in 2015.”227 Less than a year after winning the
presidency, Duda called for stripping historian Jan Gross of a high honor bestowed upon him in
1996 by the Polish government, the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit, and intense
international backlash followed. Duda was clear, Kramer notes, in asserting that his move as
president to strip Gross of the honor was “part of a wider ‘offensive’ he spearheaded to burnish
Poland’s image in the face of ‘malevolent’ attempts to ‘cast aspersions’ on the country’s
historical record and its current global standing.”228 As the American publication Politico
summed it up in a headline: “Poland turns history into a diplomatic weapon.”229
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I.

History as Nationhood

What has happened—and continues to happen—is that Poland, like most countries,
utilizes history not only as a diplomatic weapon but also as an inward-facing nationalist weapon.
When we talk about nationalism, we are talking about the constructedness of a nation.
Nationalism is a nineteenth century concept—and a Western European construct, too,
importantly. French philosopher Ernest Renan first bore the concept of nationalism in his 1882
lecture at the Sorbonne University in Paris titled “What is a Nation?” Renan delivered the lecture
as a Frenchman coming out of the Franco-Prussian War in which France suffered a humiliating
loss to Germany. Renan’s idea of a nation directly contradicts what Germany as a “nation” was
known for; his speech laid the foundations of the spectrum of civic and ethnic nationalisms
which are today still used by historians to classify nations. Renan’s ideas of a nation along with
civic and ethnic nationalisms are uniquely applicable to Western European nations and
specifically useful in drawing a dichotomy between France and Germany. French nationalism is
defined by civic traits like shared values and culture whereas German nationalism is defined by
bloodlines, language, and the land, all ethnic traits—and though these traits, bloodlines in
particular, defined nationalism in places like the Balkans, too, it still differed markedly from
France. This question of what is a nation and the way Renan set out to answer it is limiting for
historians of Central or Eastern European nations such as Poland. Geneviève Zubrzycki,
sociologist and established scholar of Polish studies, notes that “the accentuation and
naturalization of differences between ethnic and civil national understandings, and between
‘East’ and ‘West,’ ignores the diversity that exists within each region, as well as the tensions
within each mode.”230 Zubrzycki shows that we must move beyond the standard questions and
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ideology to come out of Renan’s “What is a nation?” and, I will argue, where we must go is
toward a more relevant question for Polish nationalism: who is part of the nation?
Throughout history, Poles faced many questions about what it meant to use the word
“nation” in part because their territory, a seemingly basic, first-line qualifier for a nation, was
constantly shifting. During the nineteenth century, as communities all over Europe began to
think and speak of nationhood, Poles had more reason to begin to define what “nation” could
look like and entail. Historian Brian Porter traces this in his important book When Nationalism
Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in 19th Century Poland. In the latter half of the
century, he argues, the question of what is a nation began to move toward who would be part of
the nation; this occurred alongside a pivot toward Jews as more than “other” (which they had
nearly always been) and in fact an “enemy.”231 Jews as the enemy occurred during a rise in antiSemitism, specifically anti-Semitism as a modern phenomenon. At this time, nationalist
sentiments and anti-Semitism began to be intimately intertwined because to believe in them was
to believe in being modern.
To underpin this argument, Porter traces the rise of a Polish magazine weekly, Głos (The
Voice), established in 1866 to target Polish youth.232 Głos contributed directly to the rise in antiSemitism by making it, within the pages they published, “respectable, sophisticated, and
modern.”233 Porter offers translations of a wide array of articles and editorials from all
throughout the nineteenth century in Głos along with his analysis. He writes,
…the magazine argued in 1890 that anti-Semitism ‘does not stand in the way of the
progressive moment of humanity’ and should be understood as a “positive phenomenon,
testifying to the strengthening of consciousness and social solidarity.” This brings us to
the fundamental transformation mentioned in the title of this book: the moment when it
became possible to speak of hatred within the discourse of nationalism.234
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This evidence matters because this publication shows that Polish-Jewish relations did not
always exist in a sphere of peaceful coexistence as Polish officials today say they did. At the
very core of the late-nineteenth/early twentieth century Polish national project was a hatred
against Jews. In fact, four years before claiming anti-Semitism was positive, the editors of Głos
wrote, “Every society, in relation to the Jews, must work to destroy them—whether we call this
extermination, expulsion, or assimilation does not change the essence of things. Both
Judeophiles and anti-Semites want to destroy the Jews as Jews, that is, as representative of a
separate society.”235 Coexistence was not always the nature of the relations between Poles and
Jews. Indeed, there was talk at a national level about physically removing Jews from Poland, that
Jews could never be Poles and as such posed a danger to the nation.
It is peculiar, then, that Polish officials in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries harp on “coexistence” as a defining feature of Polish-Jewish history, that Poland
welcomed Jews fleeing persecution in the eleventh century and they gloriously lived, thrived
even, since. Consider the following: less than two months after the passage of the 2018
Holocaust bill, in the midst of much international outrage, Polish President Andrzej Duda made a
visit to Auschwitz along with 12,000 visitors from 40 countries.236 This was not just any visit—it
was Yom Ha’Shoah, or Israeli Holocaust Memorial Day—and Duda did not join just any visitors.
He was there to address the crowd of March of the Living participants as they descended upon
the town of Oświęcim and prepared to walk from Auschwitz I to Birkenau. Recall that March of
the Living has come under critique by scholars such as Erica Lehrer for their explicitly antiPolish sentiments and teachings. As part of the 2018 mission, President Duda walked into
Auschwitz alongside Israeli President Reuven Rivlin and the two sat together during the
Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate, 177.
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ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of March of the Living trips to Poland and the annual
Holocaust Memorial Day. In an address to the crowd, Duda remarked, “Oświęcim was the place
of coexistence of Poles and Jews. For 1000 years, the Jewish nation regarded my country as the
land of Polin – a hospitable, safe home.”237 Duda’s March of the Living remarks show that when
confronting groups considered to be anti-Polish, the focus turns to utilizing a history of
coexistence as a diplomatic tool. His statement and precise word choice echoes what Israeli
diplomats wrote in a confidential memo previously mentioned describing their visit with Shimon
Peres to Poland in November of 1989: “Great emphasis was placed on the common history and
what [the Poles] often referred to as ‘A thousand years of coexistence’ as opposed to the bitter
memories of the more recent past.”238
In invoking the phrase bitter memories of a more recent past, the Polish officials neglect
to acknowledge that there are bitter memories even in the far more distant past. In fact, the man
widely considered to be the founder of modern Polish nationalism, Roman Dmowski, was deeply
anti-Semitic; he consistently conjured up sentiments against Jews. Dmowski contributed writing
to Głos in 1891 (before the magazine was shut down by Russian police in 1894) and his political
party, the National Democrats, existed upon a platform of extensive anti-Semitism.239 In fact,
Brian Porter argued that it was in 1919 when the National Democrats rose to prominence that
“we see an emergence of anti-Semitism as a factor in defining what it meant to have a Polish
nation.”240 And this was not any kind of anti-Semitism, it was a very particular kind: a notion of
Jews as undeniably, unchangeably Other, a belief that “most Jews were unassimilable and
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therefore could never become Poles.”241 To say that Jews would need to assimilate in order to
have a place within the Polish nation illuminates that coexistence was not the answer to any sort
of Jewish question posed in nineteenth or twentieth century Poland. Ezra Mendelsohn, a
historian, traced (among many factors) the writings of Roman Dmowski in the interwar period,
including an essay titled “Jews on the War” from 1925 in which he “declared that Jews had long
served German interests and were formidable enemies of Poland.”242 Adam Michnik, a Polish
historian, has argued that nationalism “…amounts to intolerance: it allows the rejection of
another person because of his otherness.”243 When it comes to Polish nationalism and Jews, his
warning holds true. The history of Polish nationhood makes clear that Jews were never to be part
of the story.

II.

History as Enemy

What we have, then, is a disconnect between “historical truth” as demonstrated by
evidence found within Polish writings and the history that Polish officials purport took place
between Poles and Jews. A key part of Ernest Renan’s speech involved providing a compelling,
pressing, and relevant explanation for why nationalist groups and causes work to actively revise
history. And not just revise or right history but actually disregard and cast aside unbefitting
histories. Renan said, “Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is an essential factor in the
creation of a nation and it is for this reason that the progress of historical studies often poses a
threat to nationality.”244 Nearly two centuries later, Renan’s statement was echoed and taken a
step further by Adam Michnik who wrote, “Nationalism is usually a technique of escaping
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responsibility for the past. Strangers are guilty – that is the conviction of a nationalist.”245 Polish
nationalists long cast Jews as the enemy, the stranger, and they are then able to cast historical
wrongs onto Jews themselves as opposed to Poles. We will see this later in the chapter with a
contemporary example of Polish state television invoking controversial talk about the roles of
Jews in the Holocaust who were forced by the Nazis to serve in worker roles, such as kapos in
the concentration camps or Judenrat in the ghettos.
First, though, we must return to Andrzej Duda’s (belated) call to strip Jan Gross of the
prestigious Polish national honor for the way his book Neighbors portrayed Poles as complicit in
and responsible for the massacre of a Jewish community. The international community certainly
perceived the proposal of Andrzej Duda as an attack on historical studies in the pursuit of
creating a nation, a national narrative, on the basis of tactical historical errors. The American
Historical Association (AHA), a professional organization dedicated to promoting and protecting
historical studies since it was incorporated by the United States Congress in 1889, published an
open letter to the Polish government calling Duda’s attack on Gross what it was: an attack on the
study of history. The letter, written in November 2016, also expressed concern over discussion of
what would later officially become the Holocaust bill. The ultimate request of the AHA letter is
this: “…that Professor Gross—a scholar of whom Poland can be deservedly proud—is not
prosecuted for the pursuit of historical truth that has always animated his scholarship.”246 With
this statement, the AHA takes Duda’s precise wording of “historical truth” and turns it right back
around on him to classify what Gross has done as the “real” historical truth. What is one to do
when two parties both claim to have the monopoly on historical truth in pursuit of their own
goals, goals at complete odds with each other? There are no easy answers, perhaps even no
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answers at all, though a starting point can be to understand why groups tell conflicting stories
and harness conflicting truths in the first place.
Alon Confino, a historian whose work looks at how the Nazis understood their antiJewish project, echoes Renan’s statement. Confino writes,
We all tell stories about ourselves, individual as well as national collectivities, in order to
give our lives purpose and meaning. These stories are the bedrock of our identity,
although we often tell our national stories not in order to get the facts right but to get
them wrong, to explain our history and justify our motivations for doing things, the good
deeds and especially the bad ones…247
Confino did not write his statement as a specific response to Polish histories, but it is
extraordinarily fitting nonetheless. When the Law and Justice party pushes back against Jan
Gross and the notion that Poles were complicit in causing Jewish suffering and death in World
War II, they tell stories that deliberately get the facts wrong. Take Jedwabne, the massacre of
Polish Jews at the hands of their Polish Catholic neighbors that Jan Gross meticulously
researched and presented, for example. The Polish state-run Institute of National Remembrance
could not find evidence to disprove Gross’s conclusions. Mark Kramer noted that in 2002 the
IPN published “authoritative” evidence that upheld Gross’s “basic findings.” Even though their
initial report claimed to find reduced death tolls from what Gross offered, later research indeed
found the numbers of victims and perpetrators closer to Gross’s numbers.248 The right-wing
ruling party works to encourage their constituents and the broader world to conveniently forget
unflattering aspects of national history because it is, as Renan noted, a threat to their national
project. It is also a threat to those whose histories are cast aside: Polish Jews.
It would be a fatal flaw of this project not to engage in discussion and analysis on antiSemitism in Poland as we started to do in evaluating Polish nationalism. It would also be a fatal
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flaw, however, to pretend the topic can be parsed without, well, an entire thesis-length paper
devoted to it. The history of anti-Semitism in Poland is long, storied, and complex. So much of
the attention paid to Poland’s Holocaust history bill and legislation focuses on the international
outcry: the reactions of Israel or the United States, for instance, to which the BBC article
breaking the news dedicated sub-headlines and space, or what the bill meant in the context of
rising populist parties in Europe overall. Yet this misses a crucial aspect, as a piece in The
Atlantic reported.
“Something much more important, in my judgment, is what they [Law and Justice] have
done internally,” [Jan] Gross [said] about the new law. “They have stirred anti-Semitism.
This has always been part of this party’s spiritual legacy. For God’s sake, these Jewish
victims were Polish citizens!” Gross added. “These guys who say ‘They the Jews’ and
‘We the Poles’ are out of their minds.’”249
Recall that Gross raised alarms about this issue of separating Polish and Jewish identities and
suffering nearly two decades earlier.250 He struggled and encouraged others to struggle in not
letting go of the fact that the Polish national project did not give space to answering such an
essential question. The insinuation on behalf of Polish officials? Polish Jews were not real Poles.
This has been the case since the origins of Polish nationalism—when nationalism began to hate,
as historian Brian Porter so aptly wrote—and it has not yet changed.
The Atlantic article’s reporter Rachel Donadio followed Gross’s analysis with evidence
of a shifting atmosphere toward Jews in Poland. She pulls from an Associated Press report out of
Warsaw which spoke of an “eruption” of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish sentiments in Poland
following the loud critiques of the Law and Justice party’s Holocaust bill. Marcin Wolski,
director of a state-run television station, said on air on January 29, 2018 “that the Nazi death
camps should actually be called Jewish. ‘Who managed the crematoria there?’ he asked—a
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reference to the fact that death camp prisoners, usually Jews, were forced to help dispose of gas
chamber victims.”251 The position of the Polish government when facing internally is one that is
largely rooted in anti-Semitism, yet the position of the Polish government when facing externally
is one of avid protectors of Jews and the long history of Jews in Poland dating back to the 11th
century.

III.

History as Protector

In his remarks to the Jewish participants of March of the Living, President Duda also made
mention of a moment in history highlighted by the Institute of National Remembrance’s film The
Unconquered that we evaluated in the context of Polish institutions writing national histories.
Duda launched into a defense of Polish actions in wartime as a marker of Polish innocence and
caring for their Jewish counterparts. He said,
We, Poles, consider it our duty to spread the testimony about the Holocaust across the
globe. We were doing it already at the time when Germans were executing it…But our
alarming calls fell on deaf ears. The scale of indifference is exemplified by the fact that
the call of the Polish Government to help rescue Jews was published in a brief note by
“The New York Times” on 11 December 1942, as far as page 8.252
This point is eerily similar to the wording of the propaganda film which said, “We are the first to
alert the world about the Holocaust though politics appear to be more important than human lives
and nobody listened to us.”253 With this, the Polish government is working to draw attention to
historical error on behalf of others, to distract Polish insiders and outsiders alike from the issues
at hand about historical revisionism, for instance, or writing Jewish suffering out of Polish
national history.
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These instances all point to actions by the Polish government to deflect from and defend
against historical moments where Poland as a nation or Poles as a people are understood to have
had anything negative to do with the events of World War II or anti-Semitism more broadly. Jan
Grabowski, historian and, as we previously saw, target of the Polish government, coins this as
the “Righteous Defense Argument.” He explains,
The Righteous Defense in all its variations allows for the gradual shift of Jewish victims
to the periphery of the historical account and their systemic replacement with noble
Gentiles…The Holocaust becomes a theater that provides a stage upon which Righteous
Gentiles can perform noble deeds on the largely undefined and obscure crowd of
anonymous Jews in need.254
It is worth noting that this Righteous Defense, while indeed indicative of a shift in historical
narratives, is also a sort of a “Righteous Rejection.” The Polish government is not simply
defending; they are flat-out rejecting historical facts and narratives. While this had not quite
taken place when Grabowski published his article in 2016, it had indeed taken place by the time
of the Holocaust bill’s passage in January 2018. Historian Marci Shore wrote of this fact in an
opinion piece for The New York Times days after news of the Holocaust bill’s passing became
public. She argued,
The rejection of the universal—the insistence on Polish exceptionalism—is at the heart of
Poland’s “historical policy,” which aims to control the narrative of the 20th century in
such a way as to glorify and exonerate Poles. The underlying principles are simple: a
trope of Christ-like martyrdom; a Manichaean division between innocence and guilt, and
an assurance that everything bad came from the outside.255
This rejection of particular histories is crucial because at the very heart of national movements
and nationalism overall lies a need for, as historian Stefan Berger put it, “establishing a historical
pedigree.” Berger explains that national movements “regularly celebrated foundational moments
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from which they could construct such continuous national narratives.”256 Leaders of national
movements often drew these histories from days of antiquity, and so in some ways foundational
historical pedigrees far predate any history that would be called into question via Poland’s
twenty-first century history policy or legislation. But in other ways, Poland is in fact still in the
foundational stages of building a national movement and history post-communism. The problem
is this: nationalism needs a shared history, but many histories in pursuit of a shared identity are
harmful to nationalists. If we recall Ernest Renan’s point—that forgetting and historical error is
essential to creating nations yet the process of writing history can be a threat to nationality—we
find that Poland’s Holocaust legislation epitomizes the irony, the tension, these forces of truth
with which the government is forced to reckon and, as we ultimately see, reject.
What my project adds to this discourse is the argument that this Righteous Defense or
Rejection has connections to the Americanization of the Holocaust, the process by which the
Holocaust moved from the margins to the center of American cultural life. Within this process, a
specific vision of the Holocaust emerged to the forefront of the American (and especially
American Jewish) mind: a Holocaust in Poland by Poles, the kind of moments explored in, for
instance, Schindler’s List where the young Polish Catholic girl screams “goodbye, Jews” to the
Jews moving into the Kraków ghetto. What the historical record shows, however, is that
historians of the Holocaust—specifically Polish experiences of the Holocaust, both Catholic and
Jewish—long thought specifically about how to bring narratives of righteous Poles into the
national discourse. Poland is on the defense against a phenomenon that scholars, really
historians, have worked to actually protect Poland from in meaningful ways as early as the
1980s.
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In September 1984—prior to even the conception of Schindler’s List—the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Council, the precursor to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
sent a memo to the presidents of major American Jewish organizations. The memo’s purpose
was to keep the organized Jewish community informed of the Council’s work, and that work,
importantly, involved announcing a conference called Faith in Humankind: Rescuers of Jews
During the Holocaust. The conference planned to bring scholars together to compile resources on
the subject of righteous gentiles and make those resources available to the wider public once the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum opened to the public. Among the notable scholars
advertised was Professor Nechama Tec, “Holocaust survivor and Professor at the University of
Connecticut… also actively involved in researching righteous acts that occurred in Poland.”257
Born to a Polish Jewish family in Lublin in 1931, Professor Tec’s life was saved by Polish
Catholics who hid her.258
The Council at the forefront of bringing scholarly work on the Holocaust into mainstream
American life paid special attention to righteous gentiles and to Polish righteous gentiles in
particular. This is not to say that all scholars and people more generally were talking about acts
of righteousness among Poles, not at all, but this is to say that some people were. And that is
more than the zero people whom Poland’s government has claimed for years are talking,
publishing scholarship, or bringing attention to righteous gentiles in Poland. The highest levels
of legitimate Holocaust authority in the United States—the Council responsible for the creation
of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum—engaged in bringing attention to Poles who
saved Jews. Histories are, as we have seen, nothing without nuance and complexity. It is for this
reason that an instance of the organized American Jewish community working to educate
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themselves on precisely the issue Poland stresses the world comprehend—stories of Poles
risking, even giving their lives to save Jews in wartime—is vital to this project. The Polish
government is weaponizing history in pursuit of their own national goals and not the betterment
of academic scholarship around the world.

IV.

History as Suffering

Histories of Poland often invoke the ways in which the nation has suffered. For so long,
Poles lived under the rule of foreign occupiers and Polish territory was constantly split up among
surrounding powers. Adolf Hitler specifically targeted Poles as among the worst people in
Europe, and three million non-Jewish Poles died in World War II. All of this is to say: Poland
has experienced many difficult moments throughout its history. Political scientist Adam Bromke
wrote in 1962, “It is their unhappy history which has made the Poles intensely, at times
boisterously, nationalistic.”259 And yet, even as unhappy as their history has been, Brian Porter
argues, to say all of this is to, as some Poles have done, “[produce] a national martyrology – an
elevation of the entire collectivity to the status of sanctified victim…When faced with stories
about Poles who have done bad things, proponents of this view either insist that the evildoer was
not a true Pole, or that the historian is lying.”260 We have seen this play out time and time again,
well into the present. Yet it is a claim, a reminder, a warning Porter offers in a later book that
gets at so much of what we talk about when we talk about writing and righting history: nations
don’t suffer—people do.261
What has happened as a result of Poland using history as a weapon, internally or
diplomatically, is that the individual stories are the first to become lost in the shuffle. It is the
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stories of suffering we lose, the stories of overcoming darkness, the stories of extremes and also
the stories of everything in between both during and after wartime. And these individual stories
are what we need the most in order to make sense of the past and its implications for the present
and the future. Without a willingness to share and listen and hold all of these stories at once, we
see tensions come to a head via legislation like the Holocaust bill, a way of saying certain stories
take precedence over others—and that some stories are flat out wrong. We need all stories,
however, especially those that are difficult to hear. As writer Kazuo Ishiguro put it in his 2017
acceptance speech of the Nobel Prize in Literature: “…in the end, stories are about one person
saying to another: This is the way it feels to be me. Can you understand what I’m saying? Does it
also feel this way to you?”262
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EPILOGUE
On April 16, 2019, Ryszard Legutko came to Colby College to deliver a talk, “The
Present and Future of European Democracy,” based upon his book The Demon in Democracy:
Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies. Legutko co-chairs the European Conservatives and
Reformists in the European Parliament, and he is the head of Poland’s Law and Justice
delegation to the European Parliament. His visit was a bit last minute and, to me, entirely
unexpected and of great importance: an opportunity for me to be in the same room with a highranking member of the very political party this thesis has examined, to perhaps ask a question
and evaluate how all that I have argued throughout this thesis might play out beyond the page.
Legutko stood at the front of the classroom and delivered his lecture to between fifteen
and twenty students and faculty. When the time came for him to take questions, I raised my
hand. “Both in this evening’s talk and in your book,” I began, “you say that communists and
liberal democrats cast away obligations of the past, losing respect and memory for what came
before them. My first question is what exactly are those obligations? My second question is how
do you reconcile this statement with Law and Justice casting away the past, too, by entertaining
the idea to take away Jan Gross’s Order of Merit for his work with the histories of Jedwabne?”
Legutko stayed silent for a few moments that felt to me like an eternity. He turned to the
professor chairing the event and asked, “Should I answer that?”
Upon the professors in the room telling him to please, indeed, answer the question, he
spoke of what “obligation” meant to him as a politician and a former professor of political
philosophy. Legutko then moved to the second part of my question and introduced Jan Tomasz
Gross whom he explained authored a book called Neighbors. “The book was not particularly
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well-researched,” Legutko said. “It was an all-out attack on Poland, on the Polish nation. And it
263

was received as such. If you look at scholarly reviews, at criticism—you see, Gross is not a
historian. His treatment of the sources was appalling.” As this thesis has proved, such a statement
is false. Legutko continued to say that the book gets at the treatment of Poles as accomplices to
Germans in the Holocaust. “That is rejected by a lot of people,” he said, “because those are only
isolated cases. You have to understand that helping a Jew was punishable by death to the entire
family. You can’t throw such accusations and say you Poles did not help Jews; the situation in
World War II was incomparable to that of France or the Netherlands. And still many Poles lost
their lives helping Jews!” He told the audience to look to Yad Vashem, to see the large number
of Poles recognized as Righteous Among the Nations in a classic pivot to Jan Grabowski’s
Righteous Defense argument. Finally, Legutko closed his response by saying that Gross’s book
“was not a historical dispute. It’s about today’s politics.” Gross’s book came out nearly two
decades ago, and the case of Jedwabne was, as we know, even settled by the IPN itself. It is not
Gross making the book and the history about today’s politics: it is people like Ryszard Legutko
and parties like Law and Justice doing that.
There is so much one could have responded to Legutko to push back against his claims.
Providing a reminder, for instance, of the scholarship from Andrzej Żbikowski who found that,
within rural areas of occupied Poland from 1942-1945, “in 80 to 90 percent of the cases, Poles
rescued Jews for money or other material gain, and when funds (or other valuables) were
exhausted, the attitude to those rescued changed radically.”264 But I did not respond, nor did
anyone else, and Legutko moved on to the next question. The things that he said did not surprise
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me in that I have seen them before, though to encounter someone who actively righted history
was a valuable yet disturbing experience. Legutko gave a black-and-white answer to a question
imploring him to explore the gray zones, as Primo Levi would have it. Levi was never interested
in branding people as wholly or inherently good or bad, virtuous or evil, instead choosing to see
the choices people make in their darkest moments of history as entirely complex. Yet the current
Polish government does not see history in this way; it does not serve their national project.
And so it has gone time and time again while engaged in this project. These kinds of
black and white moments all too often leave no room for any kind of moments within a gray
zone nor any space for nuance and complexity. It has felt at times that the majority of news I
came across this year—often via Twitter from the scholarly-run @NotesFromPoland account
which offers translated summaries of a variety of news articles, some key features and others
pieces that might have slipped under the radar from across the span of Polish news outlets—sat
entrenched in gray zones and was desperately deserving of being worked into this project. It is
from this account I learned, for instance, that on March 18, 2019, the Polish news reported that
there would not in fact be “further exhumations at the site of the Jedwabne massacre, after
prosecutors decided there is now no new evidence justifying such an action. The head of the IPN
and the prime minster recently raised the idea. Jewish leaders strongly oppose it.”265 The
histories within this thesis come alive on near-daily basis in the Polish news. Even when
evidence disproves claims, those claims persist. History in Poland is too often a political
exercise.
Regularly seeing stories like this one in the news and encountering Legutko’s answer to
my questions tell us two things. First, the work of this thesis is important, vitally so, because we
have to understand all facets of the past to be able to interrogate and contextualize the ways in
Violetta Baran, “Prokuratura podjęła decyzję. Nie będzie ponownej ekshumacji ofiar a Jedwabnem.” March 18,
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which Poland still in this contemporary moment uses history as a tool at home and weapon
abroad. Second, nationalist fervor is increasing in Poland and indeed across the world, including
right here in the United States with President Trump declaring in October 2018, “You know what
I am? I’m a nationalist.”266 If rewriting histories is a nationalist weapon, then bringing those very
histories into the light in ways that are digestible for all is a key to combatting the dangers of
nationalism. For every time a member of the Law and Justice Party (or anyone, really) makes a
statement that it is only worth remembering the Poles who saved Jews in wartime, someone must
be ready to call out reminders of Oskar Schindler and Jedwabne. For every time that the IPN
invokes reopening the case of Jedwabne, someone must be ready to call out that the institution
itself formally closed the case; exhuming dead bodies is a political tool of the most horrific kind.
Similarly, every time someone uses the term “Polish Death Camp,” they too should be corrected.
In calling for nuance and complexity to come from Polish interpretations of the
Holocaust, it is crucial to note that is a call, too, for nuance and complexity from American
interpretations. The Americanization of the Holocaust has targeted Poland in a way that relies
too heavily on narratives involving only Polish wrongdoing against Jews, such as the worldfamous story of Schindler’s List. I offer this to bring balance but not to say that the ways Poles
and Americans have interpreted the events of the Holocaust are of equivalence. Recall that
President Obama apologized for his “Polish death camp” remarks and the historical record, his
archived speech, was amended. We have never seen any kind of response like that from the Law
and Justice party in their historically inaccurate and intimidating remarks.
There was no chance I was going to change Ryszard Legutko’s mind about Jan Gross, but
hearing him ask “Should I answer that question?”—something he did not ask of any other
question posed to him that evening—tells me I did my job. It has been apparent since the late
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nineteenth century that histories are either brought into the light or cast aside in pursuit of
national projects and goals. We have seen this play out in Poland and seen it pick up with
intensity since certain narratives from the Holocaust took center stage in the United States and,
with the enormous success of films like Schindler’s List, across the world. Through it all, the
constant that politicians, scholars, films, and everyday people argue over, return to, hide, or
propel is stories. Ryszard Legutko might work to keep stories of Polish Jews hidden away, but
we have an opportunity and an obligation to bring them into the light. Telling stories—complex
stories, stories within gray zones, stories that are hard to hear—is what makes us human, what
we use to make sense of our past, situate ourselves within the present, and think about our future.
Writing our history sits at the crux of this, but righting our history does not.
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